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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT:
GENDER AND PROTESTS
Why do women protest? Why do women protest “as women”? Why do some
women participate in protests but not others? In the wake of the Women’s March of
2017, perhaps the largest single day protest event in history, these questions are
particularly timely and deserve scholarly attention. One important but understudied and
undertheorized motivation for women’s protests is state sanctioned violence, particularly
repression. This dissertation explicitly theorizes about how state perpetration of violence,
particularly state use of repression, both motivates and shapes women’s protests on a
global scale.
In this dissertation, I argue that one key motivation for women’s protest is
repression by the state, and I theorize that women will protest more frequently when the
state uses repression. Repression negatively impacts members of the population,
particularly relatives, friends, and communities of those targeted by the state, and this
motivates those people to protest.
However, I argue that the type of repression, and more specifically how gendered
the state practices repression, matters. The more that gender plays a role in determining
who states target with repression, the more gender matters in the societal response to
repression.
In particular, I examine the use of forced disappearances. Based on historical and
contemporary accounts, I show that forced disappearance largely targets males, and thus
motivates women’s protests but has no effect on protests by other groups. When the state
makes use of forced disappearances, some women are motivated to protest due to their
connections to victims of repression. Furthermore, opportunities to protest in these
circumstances are more available to women than to men, due to their relatively lower
likelihood of being targeted, as well as women’s distinctive positions in society and their
ability to organize themselves as women.
Not only do women have additional space relative to men to protest when the
state is repressive, but individual women recognize that their gender can serve as a
resource in such contexts. Thus, individual women are more likely to participate in
protests themselves when the state uses repression, closing the gender gap in protest
participation between men and women.
I test my theory of women’s protest using two unique approaches. First, utilizing
unique new data on women’s protests that is globally comprehensive for all countries
from 1990-2009, I show that women’s protests are more frequent when the state is
repressive, and that forced disappearances in particular motivate women’s protests,
specifically, but do not have an observable effect on general protests. Second, I utilize

regionally comprehensive data on citizens in Latin America from 2006 and 2008 to show
that women are more likely to participate in protests when the state uses forced
disappearances, but that men are not more likely to participate in protests in repressive
contexts.
KEYWORDS: women’s protest, women’s mobilization, gender, human rights,
repression, forced disappearances
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
In 2017, just one day after the inauguration of controversial United States
President Donald Trump, millions of women, largely dissatisfied with the election
outcome, took to the streets in protest (Frostenson 2017). While largely focused on
Washington, D.C., this wave of protests affected countless US cities. According to
estimates by political scientists Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth (2017), over 4.2
million people participated in sister marches across the US, making it likely to be the
largest single day demonstration in United States history. At least nine cities in the US
had marches with crowds larger than 100,000, including Washington DC, Los Angeles,
New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Denver, Seattle, and Oakland (Pressman and
Chenoweth 2017).
Figure 1 illustrates the data on Women’s March protests gathered by Pressman
and Chenoweth (2017) graphically, showing the concentration of events. As you can see,
every state in the US had at least some protest activity. The lion’s share of protests took
place along the east coast of the US, with the largest concentration of protest activity in
DC. Indeed, though the incoming Trump administration was a prime motivation for
many participants in the Women’s March, the protest was not limited to the US and was
global in scale (Frostenson 2017). Figure 1 also illustrates that every continent saw at
least some protest activity from women. Women across the globe participated in
solidarity with the March, with sister marches on every continent (including Antarctica),
and current estimates of global numbers of participants reaching as high as 300 thousand
protestors worldwide (not including protestors in the US; Frostenson 2017).
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Figure 1: Map of Women’s March, January 2017

Notes: Data on Women’s March activity from Pressman and Chenoweth (2017). Protest
locations geocoded using Stata command opencagegeo and the Open Cage Data API.
Map created with CartoDB web app.
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Why did women organize such a massive protest event? Of course, there are
many reasons that motivated the Women’s March, including fears of reversals in
reproductive rights under a Republican administration, concerns over worker’s rights and
employment non-discrimination, and uncertainty about women’s rights more generally.
However, there was one key motivation for the Women’s March that has been understudied and under-theorized by the literature on women’s protests: the Women’s March
was an explicit protest against state-sanctioned violence. In fact, if we look at the “Unity
Principles” guiding the Women’s March, the very first item listed is entitled “Ending
Violence” and reads as such:
“Women deserve to live full and healthy lives, free of all forms of violence
against our bodies. We believe in accountability and justice in cases of police
brutality and ending racial profiling and targeting of communities of color. It is
our moral imperative to dismantle the gender and racial inequities within the
criminal justice system.” - Women’s March Unity Principles (2017).
In short, though the Women’s March arose for many reasons, state sanctioned violence,
particularly police violence against minorities, was a key motivation for women who
protested. In this dissertation, I examine the role of state sanctioned violence in
motivating and shaping women’s protests worldwide, demonstrating that the Women’s
March of 2017 is not unique in this aspect: women’s protests frequently arise as a
response to state violence.
Though the full consequences of the Women’s March are yet to be seen, this
protest demonstrates that women are very involved in politics both in the US and
worldwide, and are willing to take to the streets in order to make demands of their
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government. The stated desire to end state sanctioned violence which helped to motivate
the Women’s March in particular is just another timely reminder that women do not
organize solely in favor of policies or reforms that explicitly favor women, or that relate
to explicitly gendered forms of inequality. In fact, the Women’s March of 2017 is just
the latest (and certainly largest) example in a long line of women protesting against
unfavorable conditions.
History is rife with examples of women taking to the streets to demand change,
from protests demanding women’s suffrage in the late 1800s (Teele 2014, Banaszak
1996), to the “Driving Protests” in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Begum 2017). As another
example, in Latin America women frequently played a huge part in pro-democracy
movements from the late 1970s to the 1990s (Waylen 1994). In sub-Saharan Africa,
women have disrobed in public as an act of protest against various social problems, such
as rape culture (Thompson 2017). Women have also been critical participants and
organizers in major recent social movements such as Black Lives Matter (Kaleem 2016),
while numerous women’s groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving/MADD (Bilotta
1985) or Mom’s Demands Action for Gun Sense in America (Follman 2014) have also
formed specifically to advocate for non-gendered purposes. In sum, women’s protests
are a frequent occurrence, but are not always motivated by gender specific concerns, and
understanding the role of gender in protest behavior more fully is critical to our
understanding of contentious politics more generally.
The Puzzles of Women’s Protests
Not only are women’s protests relatively frequent, they are also puzzling for a
number of reasons. In this dissertation in particular, I address three broad puzzles
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regarding women’s protests. First, protests are costly and often risky endeavors
(Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Taking part in a protest takes time and
money at minimum. In some countries, taking part in a protest can be quite dangerous
for demonstrators, particularly in places where the government does not tolerate open
opposition or areas where threats of arrest or violence are commonplace. This is perhaps
especially true for women, who often tend to have less access to networks of contacts and
resources which enable them to protest (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). The costs
of protests are not purely born by participants, either: the government highly values
quiescence from the populace, and protests constitute a breach of social order that elites
would prefer to avoid if they can (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998). This raises the
question: if both sides would prefer to avoid protests, why do we see women protest?
Women’s protests are additionally puzzling because they are gendered. In other
words, when women and women’s groups choose to organize along explicitly gendered
lines (Baldez 2002), they could be placing something of a ceiling on participation.
Though men certainly can and do protest alongside women’s groups (e.g. the many men
who turned out for the Women’s March in 2017), framing a protest as a “Women’s
March” necessarily directs the messaging of the protest to one specific gender and could
potentially halve the number of likely participants, at least in theory. Taking the opposite
line of reasoning, women often protest as part of a mixed-gender group alongside men
and women. If organizers of a protest have the option to organize in a mixed-gender
way, including both men and women and possibly expanding the number of participants,
why do women organize “as women” rather than as part of a broader, mixed-gender
group?
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Finally, women’s protests are puzzling because of how rarely many or most
women participate in protests. Typically, women are much less likely to participate in
protests than men, due to a variety of factors, such as less access to resources to lower
levels of representation among political elites (Córdova and Rangel 2016, Espinal and
Zhao 2015, Beauregard 2013, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Desposato and Norrander
2009). In spite of the lower likelihood of individual women participating in a protest
relative to men, women’s protests are not uncommon at the country level. This raises one
final question: Why do women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but not
participate at other times?
This dissertation seeks to shed light on these three questions. In particular, this
work focuses on the relationship of women’s protests to state sanctioned violence,
specifically state repression, and on how repression used by the state can both motivate
protests and shape the types of protests we observe in society. I build on previous
thought about the determinants of protest in a number of ways. Specifically, in Chapter
2, I present a theory of women’s protests in three parts. The first piece of my theory
addresses the question “Why do women protest?”. When explaining protests in general,
scholars have argued that, one of the key motivators of protest activity is state repression,
and that protests are more likely when the state uses repression (e.g. Moore 1998). I
argue that this applies to women’s protests as well, and that women will be more likely to
protest when the state uses repression than if the state does not use repression. The
second piece of my theory focuses specifically on the question of why women frequently
choose to protest “as women”, rather than seeking a potentially more inclusive nongendered protest strategy, when the state uses repression. To answer this question, I
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argue that the type of repression the state practices, and more importantly, the way gender
influences the state’s practice of repression, motivates protests by women specifically. In
particular, the use of forced disappearances as a repressive tactic by the state often
motivates women to protest, and encourages them to do so along gender lines, because
women are less likely to be targeted for disappearance and because women are able to
effectively frame their activism in gendered terms. Finally, the third piece of my theory
addresses the question of why women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but
other times do not participate. Here I argue that state repression changes the political
environment in gendered ways, and the use of forced disappearances encourages women
to participate in protests while discouraging men from participating.
Chapters 3 through 5 provide empirical tests of the implications of my theory.
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship of women’s protests and repression, and finds that
women are far more likely to protest when the state is being highly repressive. Chapter 4
shows that women are particularly likely to protest when the state uses forced
disappearances, rather than other repressive tactics (e.g. extrajudicial killings). Chapter 5
shows that individual women in society are more likely to participate in protests, relative
to men, when the state uses disappearances. Finally, I offer some conclusions about how
this theory can illustrate other examples of women’s protest, such as the Women’s March
of 2017, and how future research can benefit from the theory I develop.
Patterns in Women’s Protests
Using data on women’s protests from Murdie and Peksen (2014), Figure 2 shows
the trend for women’s protests over time, with the number of observed women’s protests
globally on the y-axis and the year on the x-axis. Based on the available data, we see that
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the absolute number of women’s protests peaked at around the year 1995. Since that
year, there has been a steady decline in the number of women’s protests, with intermittent
upswings in 2001 and 2004.
However, I should note two things regarding this time trend. First, the available
data stops in 2010, meaning that our data does not capture recent waves of massive
protest like the Women’s March in 2017. Second, throughout the entire time period
under consideration, there are never fewer than 400 observed protests by women in a
given year, which equates to roughly two women’s protests per year for every country on
earth. Thus, even as women’s protests have declined over time, they are still a frequent
and important global occurrence that merits scholarly attention. Recent events such as
the Women’s March of 2017 have illustrated that this observed decline is likely not
permanent, or at the very least, that it does not place an effective ceiling on the size and
scope of women’s protests.
In sum, when we look at the available data on women’s protests, we observe that
women’s protests are frequent on a global scale, but that the number of protests by
women has declined from an observed peak in the early 1990s. Recent events suggest
that women’s protests may be rising in frequency. In the next section, I examine what we
know about women’s protest from previous works on the subject.
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Notes: Data on women’s protests comes from Murdie and Peksen (2014). The y-axis
shows the total, global number of women’s protests for a given year.
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What We Know about Women’s Protests
Why do women’s protests occur? Previous works have offered three major
answers to explain contentious mobilization in general: grievance, political opportunity
structure, and resource mobilization (Beaulieu 2014, Murdie and Peksen 2014). In this
section, I outline each theory in turn, and explain the general expectations suggested by
each theoretical framework as they apply to women’s protests, specifically. In the next
chapter, I lay out my theory linking state repression to women’s protests, which builds
upon these previous approaches by examining the role of state repression in shaping
grievances, opportunities, and resources in gendered ways, and allows for new insights
into the causes of women’s protests.
The first major perspective on the origins of protests is grievance based.
Grievance based theories (sometimes called “relative deprivation” theories) focus on the
motivations to protest, and suggest that discontent with the current political system leads
to collective dissent (Gurr 1968, 1970, Davies 1962). Thus, individuals’ feelings of
discontent and dissatisfaction with the status quo are primary motivators for collective
mobilization. The feeling that one’s status is not in line with one’s expectations is a
necessary condition for dissent (Gurr 1970). To the extent that women perceive society
as unequal and explicitly biased against them, we should expect that women would
protest more and to organize as well (Simmons 2009). Explictly discriminatory laws and
policies against women have indeed motivated a large number of women’s protests. For
example, many women protested in favor of women’s suffrage (Teele 2014, Banaszak
1996, Costain 1992), in favor of legal protections from violence against women (Htun
and Weldon 2012), and in favor of economic equality for women (Craske 1999).
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There are two key caveats to mention for this explanation of women’s protests.
The first is that unfairness in the status quo, on its own, does not consistently lead to
dissent. For example, research looking at marital satisfaction finds that women are not
less satisfied even when expected to take on much more household work, due to
socialization and low expectations (Greenstein 1996, Major 1989, 1993). Works on the
gender wage gap find similar patterns (Jackson 1989). The second caveat is that women
do not only mobilize in protest against gender discrimination. For example, women have
been critical participants in democratization movements (Alvarez 1990, Waylen 1994,
Craske 1999), women have protested general economic conditions (Safa 1990), and many
women have even taken part in rebellions and led revolutionary groups (Kampwirth
2014, Jaquette 1973). In sum, though grievances caused by gender discrimination are
one key motivator for women’s protests, context seems to determine when objective
unfairness is perceived as unfair and thus leads to dissent, and women’s protests are often
motivated by non-gender specific goals.
Political opportunity/process theories focus on the opportunity to mobilize rather
than the motivation for doing so, and focus on the perceived ability to succeed in a
political goal. In other words, mobilization depends on a favorable political environment:
individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be
somewhat tolerant of dissent (Costain 1992, Tilly 1978, Lipset 1963). In general, this
perspective suggests that we should observe more protests by women under open,
democratic societies that tolerate opposition, and wherein persuasion can more easily
result in reform. Past works have found that women’s protests are indeed more likely
during political openings, such as periods of partisan realignment (Baldez 2002,
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Macaulay 2006, Costain 1992), during transitional periods when a state is democratizing
(Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Molyneux 1985), and when the state is at least somewhat
open (Murdie and Peksen 2014).
One important thing to note, however, is that opportunities are not objective or
static: activists must perceive an opportunity, and to an extent, activists construct
opportunities to protest (della Porta and Tarrow 2004, Banazak 1996). For example,
under the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, the state was
incredibly repressive, but women took to the streets in protest of both human rights
violations (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). They were able to do this, in part, by
strategically employing and manipulating the same cultural frames of motherhood and
family used by the regime to quash dissent from other groups, such as labor unions
(Navarro 1989). In short, even apparently “closed” or repressive systems are still
vulnerable to dissent from creative activists.
Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize
(rather than their motivations or opportunities for doing so). Access to resources mitigate
the cost of mobilization (Boulding 2014, Bell et al. 2013, Cole 2013, Tilly 1978,
McCarthy and Zald 1977). Generally, scholars looking at the role of resources in protests
have focused on either individual resources (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) or
group/organizational resources (e.g. Boulding 2014). Individuals require things like freetime, money, transportation, communication tools, and organizational skills to protest
(Murdie and Peksen 2014, Murdie and Bhasin 2011). Groups facilitate protests by
gathering, coordinating, facilitating, and distributing all the aforementioned resources to
interested parties. For both individuals weighing whether to participate in protests and
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groups trying to mobilize others for a protest, more resources, are thought to lead to more
protests.
In the next chapter, I build on all three theories of mobilization to examine the
causes of women’s protests specifically as they relate to practices of state repression.
The first two hypotheses I present reflect the consistency of effects of repression on
protest activity across women’s protest and protest in the general population, while the
third hypothesis reflects the distinctiveness of women protesting state repression as
women. The final two hypotheses shift the unit of analysis from the country level to the
individual level, and suggest that while it is generally the case that women are less likely
to participate in protests, women actually become at least as likely as men to participate
in protests when the state uses repression.
Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation contributes to our broader understanding of politics in at least
four ways. First, our understanding of women’s protests is still relatively
underdeveloped. While many authors have made important contributions to
understanding women’s protests, works on this subject tend to focus on a single case or a
small number of cases (Mooney 2007, Baldez 2002, Banaszak 1996, Alvarez 1990,
Molyneux 1985). This is partially because, until very recently, no globally
comprehensive data on women’s protests existed at the cross-national level (Murdie and
Peksen 2014). In this project, I seek to provide a more globally comprehensive view of
patterns women’s protests, particularly as they relate to repressive actions taken by the
state. This approach is useful because it allows me to both build my argument with as

13

general a scope as possible, and to test its implications on as wide a range of data as is
currently available.
I contribute to our theoretical understanding of women’s protests by developing a
novel theory of women’s protests which builds on past perspectives of protest. First, I
apply the logic of repression and dissent to women’s protests in particular. In this
respect, I argue that women’s protests are similar to other protests in that they are a
reaction against the negative actions of the state. However, building upon both grievance
and political opportunity structure arguments, I also argue that women’s protests are
distinct, and are different in many respects from general protests that include both men
and women. Because the state practices repression in gendered ways, women are
affected differently by repression and react to it in different ways. In particularly
repressive contexts, women actually have additional advantages for mobilizing that give
them agency to protest when other groups cannot. Thus, I show that under particular
political contexts, certain identity categories (in this case, womanhood) confer additional
resources for mobilization to potential protestors.
My theory not only contributes to our understanding of protests but also to the
scholarly understanding of the effects of repression, by suggesting that not all repression
is practiced the same way and different types of repression can meet very different
reactions from the public. My research suggests that we should continue the process of
opening up the “black box” of repression to think about specific types of repression in
order to best understand the possible consequences of repression. To date, all of the
quantitative human rights scholarship which looks at specific repressive tactics has
focused exclusively on the practice of torture (Conrad 2014, Conrad, Haglund, and
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Moore 2014, Conrad and Ritter 2013, Conrad and Moore 2010, Vreeland 2008) 1. This
dissertation represents a first step towards broader theorizing about the other types of
repressive tactics by focusing predominantly on the practice of forced disappearance. I
find that the state does not apply all types of repression equally to all groups in society,
and so the type of repression used matters significantly for what reactions are likely to
occur and from which social groups (like protests from women, in this case).
My theory aims to be general and can be used to think about other important
questions. There are three main ways in which I anticipate future research can utilize my
theory. First, my theory aims to be general, and can provide a framework for integrating
future work on the subject of women’s protests. For example, in the conclusions of this
project, I speculate about the ways in which my theory can help us to understand the
Women’s March of 2017. Secondarily, my theory can be used as a way to understand
protests by other marginalized groups besides women. My theory can be applied to
dynamics of protest by ethnic and racial minorities, religious minorities, and other groups
where the state is using repression in a targeted manner, and it suggests that members of
the group that are the most targeted may be the least able to protest, but that . Thirdly,
my theory can be used to inform policy from international actors and advocacy groups
concerned with human rights abuses. My research suggests that in certain repressive
contexts, women and women’s groups are highly likely to protest, and thus organizations

1

For some conceptual/qualitative work on extrajudicial killings, see Kessler and Werner
(2008), Ojie (2006), and Guiora (2004). For some similar works on political
imprisonment, see Pohlman (2008) and Vo (2003). Note that none of these works are
cross-national or quantitative in nature.
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should anticipate women’s protests in those circumstances and provide additional support
and coverage to help keep women safe during protests.
Finally, I also contribute to our understanding of protests by empirically
examining an as-yet underutilized source of data on women’s protests collected by
Murdie and Peksen (2014). To date, only Murdie and Peksen (2014) have used this
wealth of data to empirically examine the determinants of women’s protests. In addition,
I also examine the determinants of women’s protests at two levels, using both country
level data and individual level data. This two-level approach allows me to better
illustrate the nature of protests as a group and individual level activity, that require both
organizational resources and individual willingness to participate.

16

Chapter 2 – Theory
In this chapter, I lay out my argument. The theory I present focuses on answering
three main questions. First, why do women’s protest occur? Or rather, in what ways are
women’s protests similar to other, non-gendered protests? Secondarily, why do women
protest “as women”? In other words, why do women sometimes choose to organize
around their gender identity, and other times take part in broader protests involving both
men and women? Finally, why do individual women choose to participate in protests?
Put another way, in what contexts are women more likely to participate in protests,
relative to men?
In the following sections, I provide additional context to these questions based on
past works on contentious politics. I first define the key concepts used in this work,
namely protests and women’s protests. Then, I further elaborate on the three theoretical
puzzles this work seeks to illuminate. After fully setting up these theoretical puzzles, I
provide my answers to these questions, creating a new theoretical framework for
conceptualizing and explaining women’s protests which focuses on the role of state
repression in motivating and shaping women’s activism, while integrating and building
upon previous theories of repression and dissent, grievances, political opportunity
structures, and resource mobilization.
What is a Protest?
Before turning to the larger theoretical questions of this dissertation, it is worth
elaborating on the general conceptual framework and working definitions of key terms
used in my argument. In particular, first I wish to briefly define “protests”, draw
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conceptual distinctions between protests and the related concept of a “social movement”.
I elaborate on the definition of “women’s protests” specifically in the following section.
Conceptually, I adopt the definition of protest from Barnes and Kaase (1979):
protests are direct, political actions that are “unconventional” and non-institutional,
taking place outside of formal channels for revising the status quo such as voting or legal
challenges to policy. Protests must involve a person or group of people gathered in a
specific location. There are various forms a protest can take, such as sit-ins, marches,
vigils, rallies, or pickets. Protests are specific events, that occur over a defined time
period, organized by a group of people, that seek to challenge the status quo. The key
characteristic of a protest for my purposes is that it must be “revisionist” (Quaranta
2015): protests seek to change some aspect of social reality, for example, to raise wages
or end child labor practices.
The major confusion present in some previous work is the distinction between a
protest and a social movement. Protests are, in fact, conceptually distinct from social
movements, but the distinctions between the two concepts is not always made clear in
past works. Protests and social movements are herein defined as related but distinct
sociopolitical phenomena. I adopt the definition of what constitutions a social movement
originating within the resource mobilization perspective laid out by McCarthy and Zald
(1977): a social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs which represents
preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution
of a society”. In other words, social movements are abstract changes in public opinion or
perception among groups of citizens, rather than specific gatherings of people with a
concrete goal. For example, the US women’s suffrage movement was the broader
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philosophical and political movement which aimed to change people’s preferences in
favor of giving women the right to vote, whereas the Woman Suffrage Procession of
1913 was a protest organized by members of that movement. Protests may occur in the
context of a social movement (e.g. members of the Black Lives Matter movement
coordinate a “die-in”), or they may arise spontaneously as a reaction to specific changes
in the political environment (e.g. previously unorganized workers go on strike due to a
new overtime regulation).
This work is intended to examine protests, exclusively, rather than social
movements. My theory should apply equally to all protests regardless of whether they
occur as part of a broader social movement or spontaneously. In this dissertation, I do
not assume or hypothesize about any causal or temporal relationship between these
concepts: a protest may be organized as part of a social movement, a spontaneous protest
may gain momentum and eventually help to create a social movement, a social movement
may not be associated with any specific protests, and likewise a protest may or may not
be associated with any particular social movement. Broadly speaking, conditions thought
to give rise to social movements are thought to apply equally to protests, and vice versa,
and insights from scholars of social movements are critical for understanding protests.
If there are meaningful distinctions between the conditions thought to give rise to
or encourage social movements and those that give rise to or encourage protests, a broad
reading of the literature does not provide clues in that direction. Generally, authors who
study women’s social movements or protests often treat the two concepts as essentially
interchangeable. Naturally, this does not prove that there are not meaningful distinctions
or differences in causal pathways between these two concepts, merely that if such
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distinctions do exist, they are currently ill defined by the literature available. This work
does not seek to illuminate any such differences in conceptualization or differences in
causal pathways for women’s protests, movements, or both, nor to criticize past authors
for treating these two concepts as one, merely to point out this prevailing implicit
equivalence found in past works.
What is a Women’s Protest?
This dissertation is predominately an exploration of the factors that lead to
women’s protests, specifically, and an attempt to situate women’s dissent in a broader
understanding of social unrest. However, the definitional question of “what is a women’s
protest?” deserves further consideration, because the definition used will have conceptual
and theoretical implications for the rest of the work, and prior works tend to treat the
meaning the concept of a “women’s protest” as self-evident. What characteristics
distinguishes a “women’s protest” from the more general category of “protests”, as
defined in the previous section? There are three possible attributes for defining a
women’s protest.
The first condition is perhaps the most obvious. A women’s protest is a protest in
which the participants are, primarily or exclusively, women. In other words, a women’s
protest is a protest “of women”. I argue that this is a necessary but insufficient condition
for defining a women’s protest. After all, women have enthusiastically participated in
many protests that are not considered women’s protests, such as the pro-democratization
movements in many regions of the world (Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Baldez 2003).
The heavy involvement of women in a protest, on its own, is not enough to delineate a
women’s protest from other kinds of protest.
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The second condition is the most important for this work. In order for a protest to
“count” as a women’s protest, it must be framed as a women’s protest (Baldez 2002).
Thus, a women’s protest is a protest “by women” – one that is characterized by both
participants and outside observers as led by a “woman” or “women” (Murdie and Pekson
2014). In other words, a women’s protest is one in which the organizers of the protest
choose to call it a women’s protest, specifically. This is arguably the most important
qualification for defining women’s protests, and likely why previous authors treat the
concept as given: A women’s protest is a protest that defines and frames itself as a
women’s protest (leading to the “know it when you see it” approach adopted by some
previous works). I argue that this, too, is a necessary but insufficient attribute for a
women’s protest. It is reasonable to also require that at least some number of women be
involved in a protest, on top of the protest being framed as a women’s protest. In
conjunction with the first condition, these are the two conceptual conditions that I adopt
to define women’s protests in this project. In other words, when I am speaking of
women’s protests, I mean a protest that both involves women (primarily) and is framed as
a women’s protest by the participants of the protest.
I adopt these first two conditions to define women’s protests for my purposes.
However, there is a third potential way to conceptualize women’s protests, which is
worth mentioning here even though I do not adopt this conceptualization. This view
looks at the stated goal of the protest to see whether it is focused on women’s issues. In
other words, this view is that women’s protests are protests “for women”, where the
explicit goal of the protest is to improve or change the status of women, specifically.
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I do not adopt this “goal focused” definition of women’s protests, for two reasons.
The first is to avoid the trap of essentialism. Women have many and varied political
interests (just as men do), not all of which are predominantly or even particularly gender
specific. As Alvarez (1990) put it:
“When one considers that women span all social classes, ethnicities, religions,
nationalities, political ideologies, and so on, then an infinite array of interests
could be construed as women’s interests. Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual
preference and other social characteristics determine women’s social posititioning
and shape women’s interests.”
Women often do protest for gender specific reasons or goals (for example, women’s
suffrage), but a “women’s protest” could theoretically be about anything – police
violence, economic inequality, education policy and so on.
In addition to avoiding definitionally flattening women’s protests into only
protests about “women-specific” issues, there are theoretical reasons I do not adopt this
condition as part of my conceptual framework. This project seeks, in large part, to
illuminate the choice of framing a protest as a “women’s protest”, especially in
circumstances where the goal of, or motivation for, the protest is not specific to women.
Such a question would not be possible if I defined women’s protests as only having
gender specific goals, nor would such a conception capture the vast array of reasons for
women’s protests. For these reasons, I reject conceptualizing women’s protests as
protests about “women- specific” issues or with gender specific goals.
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Why do Women’s Protests Occur?
Protesting is a costly activity. At a minimum, a participant has to have time off
from work and other responsibilities, and transportation to an event that could be far from
their home. Above that, there are the many activities needed to organize a protest, such
as securing a location, registering necessary permits, spreading the message to as many
people as possible. For women in particular, the costs for protesting can be particularly
high, since women in many families are often expected to do unpaid work at home, such
as childrearing and housekeeping, in addition to often working outside the home as well
(Craig and Mullan 2010, Craske 1999, Safa 1990, Stevens 1973). Protests can also carry
high risks for participants: national governments and local police forces are often quite
hostile to opposition (Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). Protestors can
face arrest, physical harm, or even death when the political environment is unfavorable.
However, protests are not merely costly for those participating in them or
organizing them – protests are also quite costly, and risky, for the state. Protests are a
sign of weak political institutions – if the state is failing to respond to the needs of
citizens, they are more likely to protest (Boulding 2014). States value quiescence from
the populace, because obedience and peaceful order supports the extraction of taxes, the
creation of wealth, and increases the legitimacy of the state (Davenport 2007). Protest
can halt or interfere with business activity in affected areas, cause blockages of traffic or
trade, and otherwise disrupt the daily activities of society. At the extremes, protest can
foment into full scale revolution, encourage coups d’état, and otherwise lead to a
complete breakdown of political order (Johnson and Thyne 2016, Casper and Tyson
2014).
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Given all these costs and risks, it is reasonable to assume that both the state and
protest participants would actually prefer to avoid protesting, if at all possible. In other
words, we can think of protests as inefficient bargaining outcomes: both sides (i.e. both
dissidents and the state) would prefer to come to an agreement without actually needing
to pay the costs, or run the risks of allowing, protest, because protest is costly (Beaulieu
2014, c.f. Fearon 1995). However, we see that protests occur rather frequently within
nearly every country. This begs the question: why do women protest? I return with an
answer to this question in later sections of this chapter, focusing on the undertheorized
but important motivation that state repression provides for women’s protests, but first, I
elaborate on this question further by asking more specific questions about women’s
protests.
Why do Women Protest “as Women”?
Women’s protests are not only puzzling because protests in general are thought of
as ex post inefficient or failed bargaining outcomes. Women’s protests are also
interesting because they are explicitly gendered. Why do women choose to protest “as
women”, that is, on the basis of their shared gender identity (Baldez 2002)? In other
words, why do women sometimes frame a protest as a “women’s protest”, but at other
times women simply take part in broader, non-gendered protests (i.e. protests that make
no reference to gender and do not use gender identity as a mobilizing factor)?
This is a particularly interesting puzzle to consider, because framing a protest as a
women’s protest may well limit the potential number of participants to only women (and,
perhaps, those sympathetic to women as a political group). This is not to say, of course,
that people who are not women can’t participate in a women’s protest, but it seems likely
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that they are less willing to do so. If we assume that, all else being equal, protest
organizers would prefer to organize the largest protest event possible (which seems like a
reasonable assumption to make), limiting the potential number of participants by framing
the protest as a women’s protest doesn’t make sense.
The most obvious answer from previous works is that women frame a protest as a
women’s protest when the goal of the protest is gender specific. In other words, women
may mobilize “as women” in service of their strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985).
For example, we could think of protests by women in support of something like women’s
suffrage as having goals specific to, and arguably primarily beneficial to, women. For
protests where the goal of the protest is explicitly gendered, and thus the protest is
already unlikely to attract participants who are not women, framing the protest in
explicitly gendered terms might not be seen as limiting.
However, this ignores the reality that women’s protests have occurred with as
many goals as any other type of protest. Women are not a monolithic group or a unitary
actor, and women participate on all sides of almost every major political conflict that
exists. For example, women participate heavily in pro-democracy movements (Waylen
1994, Noonan 1995), human rights protests (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), economic
equality protests (Safa 1990), and even full-scale revolutions (Kampwirth 2014, Jaquette
1973). Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that women’s protests only occur for
gender specific goals.
And so the question remains: given that women’s protests occur for all kinds of
reasons, why do women frame protests as women’s protests? In the rest of this chapter, I
argue that women’s protests are, in some ways, similar to other forms of protest, but that
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gender also plays a significant role in shaping protest behavior in ways that are not
obvious. I argue that women dissidents frame some protests as “women’s protests”
strategically, choosing to make the trade-off of limiting the number of potential
participants in exchange for perceived benefits, but not always because the protest has
gender specific goals.
Why do Women Participate in Protests?
Up to now, I have focused largely on the protest behavior of women as a group,
and the collective framing of protests by participants. Women’s protests are fairly
frequent at the country level, and women’s protests are more common in some
circumstances than others. However, protests are made up of individuals, and without
participants, there can be no protest. As mentioned earlier, protests are costly for
participants, and women in particular can find it especially difficult to participate in
protests. This is partly because women often have less access to the resources necessary
to take part in protests (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994, Verba, Burns, and
Schlozman 1997). Economic marginalization leads women to participate less in civic life
compared to men (Craske 1999). Women are often expected to take on additional
responsibilities at home, even as more and more women have entered the labor force
(Craske 1999, Stevens 1973). The literature generally suggests that women will be less
likely to protest than men.
Empirical findings from recent works bear out this expectation. Much research
using survey data to compare men and women’s political activism has found a “gender
participation gap”, the consistent finding in survey-based research that women are less
politically active than men. Specifically, women are less likely to participate in protests
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than men (Desposato and Norrander 2009, Zetterberg 2009, Córdova and Rangel 2016).
Works like Córdova and Rangel (2016) have examined the conditions under which this
gender gap shrinks or disappears, and women protest at roughly equal rates as men.
However, works seeking to elaborate on which political conditions can mitigate the
gender gap in participation have largely focused on the role of certain institutional
arrangements, namely proportional representation (Beauregard 2013), gender quotas
(Barnes and Burchard 2013), and compulsory voting (Córdova and Rangel 2016) on the
gap between men and women’s political participation.
Comparatively less is known about the role of other state practices in shaping the
gender participation gap. So, this puzzle still remains: why do individual women take
part in protests? Why do women sometimes participate in protests, but at other times
tend to stay home? Later in this chapter, I look at the role of state repression in shaping
an individual’s choice of whether or not to participate in a protest. Though women are
usually less likely to participate in protests than men, I argue that when the state is
repressive, particularly when the state practices repression in a gendered way, gender
identity can serve as a resource to women and provide women with additional space to
protest relative to men.
General Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, I have set up three major related theoretical puzzles: why do
women’s protest occur, why do women protest “as women”, and why do individual
women participate in protests? These are broad, complex questions with conceivably
infinite answers. Rather than attempt to give a complete accounting for all the possible
answers to these questions, I instead focus this dissertation on the goal of providing a few
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novel, but specific, answers to these questions from an undertheorized and understudied
perspective. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the links between women’s protest
and repression by the state. I argue that state repressive practices both motivate protests
by women, and shape the form that those protests eventually take, in meaningful ways.
Before turning to my argument, I should note how my approach differs from
previous theories specifically explaining women’s protests. There are generally two
previous approaches to studying the causes of women’s protests. The first, best
exemplified by Murdie and Peksen (2014), is to expling women’s protests with a gender
conscious application of perspectives used to explain other protests. Murdie and Peksen
(2014) thus seek to explain women’s protests by applying general explanations for
protests, such as resource mobilization or political opportunity structures, to women’s
protests, by looking at how those factors could be measured for women, specifically. For
example, Murdie and Peksen (2014) succeed in showing that women’s protests are
motivated by discrimination against women in the political and economic arena. I build
on their work by examining women’s protests in the broader context of social unrest –
theorizing that women’s protests can sometimes be a result of negative actions by the
state which are not wholly specific to women.
The second approach generally examines women’s protests (or social movements)
as uniquely gendered phenomena. Rather than treat women’s protests as similar to other
protests, these works examine women’s protest in isolation. In particular, Baldez (2002)
serves as a primary example of this approach. She builds her argument starting from the
observation that all women’s movements share something in common: the decision to
mobilize as women, on the basis of commonly held notions of women’s identity. Her
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work seeks to explain why women perceive particular historical moments in gendered
terms (thus choosing to frame their mobilization as women’s movements). She argues
that activist women will frame their movement as a women’s movement when gender
serves as a useful unifying frame, because gender is the characteristic that all women
share. Baldez (2002) further argues that the single most universal aspect women share in
common, despite their unique individual experiences, is a history of political
marginalization. Baldez (2002) shows that women frame their movement in gendered
terms strategically, but only focuses on a single condition that might incentivize that
framing strategy (i.e. partisan realignments). I build on her work by returning to her
observation that all women’s protests share one commonality: they were framed as
women’s protests by participants. This dissertation expands on her approach by
examining other conditions, besides partisan realignment, that incentivize framing a
protest in gendered terms.
My theoretical approach thus differs from both of these past approaches but
explicitly builds from their foundations. Rather than treat women’s protests as motivated
only by woman-specific discrimination, or focus exclusively on the shared genderspecific framing that all women’s protests exhibit, I adopt an integrated approach. I
explicitly theorize about circumstances that encourage women’s protests, specifically,
and which circumstances might affect women’s mobilization in the same way as any
other protest. This approach allows me to better situate women’s protests in a broader
understanding of social unrest. I accomplish these goals by focusing on the specific
relationships between women’s protests and state repressive practices.
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In Figure 3, I outline the general process described by my theory. The process
involves 3 key actors, the state, activists, and the citizenry. At decision point 1, the state
decides whether or not to use repression. If the state uses repression, activists at point 2
decide to either organize a protest or not. Given that at least some activists seek to
organize a protest, they decide at point 3 whether or not to frame the protest as a
“women’s protest”. Finally, at point 4, other citizens that are observing the ongoing
protest can decide whether to join in a protest, or not.
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Figure 3: Theoretical Process of State Repression and Protest
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So, using the illustration in Figure 3 as a guide, what causes women’s protests?
The general story goes as follows: the state first decides whether or not to engage in
repression. If the state does not use repression, there may still be protests, but those
protests will not be motivated by repression but by something else (e.g. adverse economic
conditions). If the state does repress, citizens may decide to protest against the
repression, or not. If the citizens decide not to protest, the process ends, and no protests
are observed under the repressive context. If citizens decide to protest, they must then
decide how to frame that protest. There are a potentially endless number of possible
framings for protests, but for my purposes I am only interested in the choice between
framing a protest as a women’s protest or not. As I will argue in more detail later in this
chapter, the more gendered the practice of repression is, the more women’s protests are
incentivized compared to general protests. Finally, given that either a women’s protest,
general protest, or both, are occurring in a given context, individual women are then
faced with the choice of joining or not joining the protest.
The rest of this chapter fills in the details for this general outline. In the next
section, I contextualize decision points 1 and 2, showing that when the state is repressive,
women are motivated to protest. In the following section, I examine decision point 3, by
opening up the “black box” of repression to show that repression by the state is gendered,
and thus certain repressive tactics are more likely to incentivize women’s protests
compared to others. In the final section, I examine decision point 4, and argue that under
specific repressive contexts, women’s gender identity is a salient political resource that
encourages more women to take part in protests.
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Women Protest Repression
First, let us examine decision points 1 and 2 from Figure 3. In this section, I
argue that state repression constitutes a salient grievance against the state. Thus, I will
argue, when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest. This expectation, for
the purposes of this section, is not gendered: in this respect, I argue that women’s
protests are, in this way, similar to any other protest. However, note that in the following
two sections, I show that the full picture is more complex than this starting point, and that
gender plays a significant role in both the practice of repression by states and the
experience of, and reaction to, repression by citizens.
In arguing that repression from the state motivates women’s protests, I build on a
number of previous theoretical explanations for protests. In particular, I build on the
grievance perspective (Gurr 1970) to argue that repression is a key motivation for
women’s protests, and one that has not been thoroughly examined by those studying
women’s protests. Turning first to the grievance perspective, the grievance literature
suggests that people protest when they have a salient grievance against the state. As
such, past works looking at women’s protests specifically have found that women protest
when they have a grievance. For example, women are more likely to protest when
women are not politically equal to men in a given country (Murdie and Peksen 2014).
However, protest activity within a given country generally varies a great deal over
time (see, for example, the variation I showcase within Latin American countries in
Figure # in Chapter 5), while women’s political status does not change much over time
within any given country. Thus, I argue that we should broaden our focus from relatively
static factors that constitute grievances (such as women’s legal rights which change
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infrequently and are largely stable over time) to include more fluid negative state
behaviors that might cause women to have grievances against the state that might have
little to do with women’s rights specifically.
In particular, I argue that state repression is another salient grievance that
motivates women to protest. When the state is repressive, I expect that women will
protest more frequently. When the state targets citizens with repressive tactics, women
will be affected just as men are. Thus, women will be motivated to protest much the
same as men would be. Protests are costly endeavors, but the possibility of a protest
stopping the state from repressing further in the future provides a benefit that some
citizens and some women will find valuable enough to incentivize protesting. Consider
the following accounts of contemporary repression in Mexico, historical repression in
Argentina, which show that state repression is one important cause of women’s protests.
The 2014 Disappearances in Mexico
On September 26th, 2014, 43 students in Mexico were kidnapped by police and
subsequently “disappeared” (Semple 2016). The students were undergraduates at a
teacher’s college, and had been en route to a protest event (BBC 2016). According to a
recent report, the government of Mexico has detained 123 people, including many police
officials, in relation to the kidnappings, and the government has also linked the local
Iguala police force to a powerful drug gang (Semple 2016). While some remains have
been recovered and identified, the ultimate fate of “The 43” is still largely unknown, and
the government of Mexico has been characteristically uncooperative with international
investigations (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015). Journalists and investigators reporting
on the incident have been subjected to death threats and killed in some instances
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(Vulliamy 2015). In the wake of the disappearances, a wave of protests erupted in Iguala
and elsewhere in Mexico, some of which turned violent (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015,
Castillo 2014). Parents and relatives of the disappeared have been active in seeking
information about their children, advocating for justice to be done, and coordinating
protests against the government and its handling of the situation (Alfred 2015).
The mothers of the missing students, in particular, have been especially prominent
in protesting against the government. In an interview with reporters, Maria de Jesus
Tlatempa, whose son is among the missing students, said that protesters would continue
to make demands to the President of Mexico: “We won’t rest, we will be a pebble in his
shoes. We won’t go home” (quoted in both Alfred 2015, and Goldman 2015). Another
mother, addressing a crowd of angry protesters, said “We’re poor, but we’re not stupid
[…] We want the truth, we don’t want any more lies […] We’ll fight until we find our
sons” (quoted in Goldman 2015). One group of mothers travelled nearly 2,000 miles to
the United States, attempting to meet with the Pope during his visit and ask him to speak
out against the government (NBC 2015). Nor were the mothers of disappeared victims
the only women to turn out in protest. Maria Antonieta Lugo, a member of a group of
housewives who joined in the protests without experiencing a personal loss themselves,
articulated that they had joined in "because we have children of the same age" as the
students who had gone missing, "This could happen to our children as well” (quoted in
Stevenson and Sherman 2014).
Even though forced disappearances first gained attention during the earlier era of
military dictatorships in Latin America, the issue of forced disappearance remains
gravely important in many countries, and accounts of these instances suggest that similar
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dynamics still apply. While the most recent incident in Iguala, Mexico, certainly drew a
great deal of international attention and domestic ire, the disappearances of the 43
students hardly represent an unusual occurrence in Mexico or Latin America more
generally, even in the post-democratization period. During Mexico’s recent “war on
drugs” (2006-2012), upwards of 26,000 individuals are estimated to have been
disappeared (CBS 2013). Note that those numbers are the government’s official
estimates, and likely represent an undercount of the cases. More than 16,000 unidentified
bodies have been found, and the disappearances have continued largely unabated under
the present presidential administration, despite campaign promises to end the war on
drugs (Human Rights Watch 2014). Just as was the case in Argentina during the “dirty
war”, most of the victims have been young, working class men with families (Human
Rights Watch 2014).
Nor is Mexico alone in the region, as Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican
Republic have all recently grappled with forced disappearances. Colombia, in part due to
a long running civil conflict, is perhaps the worst case in recorded history, with
disappearances occurring on an unprecedented scale. Government estimates put the
number of missing persons at an upwards of 51,000 (even with known underreporting),
with a large number of cases occurring from 2000 to 2003 (Haugaard 2010). As with the
43 Iguala students, parents and relatives of the disappeared have advocated for justice and
desperately sought information about their children’s fates (Human Rights Watch 2014).
Women’s Protests under the Military Regimes of Latin America
The contemporary accounts above, which showed women taking to the streets to
make demands even as the government is highly repressive of opposition, is corroborated
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by the history of Latin America during the period of military rule which saw similar
accounts of women’s protests. In particular, historical evidence from Argentina suggests
that repression by the state motivates women to protest. During the “dirty war” in
Argentina (1974 to 1983), an estimated 10 to 30 thousand people were “disappeared” by
the military dictatorship (Wilson 1993). There were at least 300 different detention
centers in operation, and many of their prisoners went undocumented. Many of those
taken were tortured, those prisoners that the government never released or whose bodies
have not been found are presumed dead. At a time when the military was openly
repressing all civil opposition, women began to meet in the open in protest, in spite of
danger to their persons.
Argentina had an unusually high amount of human rights activism, especially
protests and organizations of women, relative to other military regimes and newly
democratizing states in Latin America (Sikkink 2008). As I have mentioned, the Mothers
of the Plaza de Mayo are the best-known Argentine women’s human rights organization
(Wilson 1993). Due to (and in spite of) rampant abuses by the government, Argentine
women took to the streets in large numbers to demand change. The Mothers of the Plaza
de Mayo (and related women’s organizations) gathered weekly to shame the
government’s actions and plead for information on their missing children 2. Made up
originally of the mothers of victims of politically motivated disappearances, this
organization marched weekly near the capital wearing their distinctive white hoods to
demand information on their children’s whereabouts. From 1976 to the mid-80s, during
the military regime and the democratization period, organized human rights protest from
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One offshoot organization still meets every Thursday at the Plaza.
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the Mothers (and other groups) was overwhelming. Under similar conditions of civil
strife, similar groups of mothers began protesting in Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and
several other Latin American states. In each case, it was the disappearance of a loved one
that motivated these women to form groups, take action, and protest against the
government’s repressive practices.
These cases demonstrate that repression by the state can be a powerful motivation
for protests. When the state engages in repression, as it did in the examples previously
discussed, this inflicts harm on victims’ families, their friends, and their communities.
This harm constitutes a meaningful grievance against the state among those connected to
the victims of repression. This grievance motivates some people to take action,
specifically by protesting against the state. Given that women are likely represented in
any large social group, and make up roughly half of any given population, women are at
least as likely to be affected by repression enacted by the state, and so women should be
incentivized to protest when the state uses repression, in much the same way that we
expect other protests to form when the state is repressive. In this sense, I expect that
women’s protests are motivated by repression in much the same way other forms of
protest can be responses to repression.
H1 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government is repressive
than when the government is not repressive.
Wheras contemporary and historical evidence suggests that women react to state
repression with protest, in the same way that general protests often arise from state
repression (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998), the broader literature on the relationship
between protest and dissent suggests further qualifications. The long line of literature on
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the “repression-dissent nexus” has generally found a strong relationship between
repression from the state and protest among citizens (Regan and Henderson 2002, Moore
2000). However, these works suggest that the relationship between repression and
dissent is more complex than the historical evidence I have considered so far.
Specifically, these works find that state repression can both motivate, and be motivated
by, protests (Moore 2000). Also, though repression can anger some citizens and cause
them to protest, but repression might also deter citizens from protesting. In other words,
repression and dissent are endogenous. This suggests caution while interpreting any
observed relationship between state repression and women’s protests. Because protests
and repression are codetermined, empirical analyses may overestimate the statistical
significance and substantive effect of repression on women’s protests.
However, this possibility is not a huge concern for this particular research for a
number of reasons. The first is that repression and dissent are interconnected, but the
specific pathway from state repression to protests is multidirectional: sometimes
repression motivates protests, but sometimes repression deters protests, and sometimes no
effect is observed (Davenport 2007). On the opposite side, however, the relationship is
unidirectional: states generally respond to protests with repression (Davenport 2007). In
fact, this relationship is so consistently observed, it is known as the “Law of Coercive
Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007). This is because the state values quiescence, or
peaceful obedience, by the general public. My research focuses explicitly on the first
pathway, and argues that for women’s protests in particular, we should observe protests
in response to repression. If repression by the state actually deters protests by women,
this would only reduce the likelihood of observing the expected positive relationship
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between repression and women’s protests, rather than increase the likelihood of a Type I
error.
If we are to take seriously Davenport’s (2007) suggestion to begin theorizing to
explain the imbalanced findings about repression causing dissent, then this dissertation
represents a step in that direction by examining the types of protests which arise from
dissent, focusing on women’s protests in particular. In particular, the next section
unpacks the effects of different repressive tactics on protests by different groups. I argue
that women’s protests have a distinct relationship to state repression as compared to
general protests.
The second reason the endogeneity problem is not particularly problematic is that
gender stereotypes influence states’ perceptions of political threats. In particular, as I
elaborate on further in the next section, states typically do not view women as a salient
political threat. Though women can and do face repressive retribution from the state, it is
far more likely that women protestors will be ignored by the state. I will leave this
observation for now, but I return to it later in the next step of my argument about why
women might protest as women.
Women Protest Forced Disappearances
Having established the general expectation that the more repressive a state is, the
more women will protest, I now turn to theorizing about why women choose to protest
“as women”, or not, at decision point 3 (Figure 3). To explain this decision in the context
of state repression, here I argue that repressive practices are gendered, that as a
consequence of this, the effects of repression are gendered, and thus protests motivated
by repression are likely to be gendered as well. Looking specifically at the state’s use of
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forced disappearances, I show that women are less likely to be targeted by the state, but
are still victimized by the loss of a family member or friend, which motivates women to
protest when the state uses forced disappearances. Women consequently use their gender
identity as a shield to minimize the danger to themselves of facing backlash from the
state for protesting, and thus are able to effectively mobilize as women, while broader
protests including both men and women would likely be vulnerable to additional
repression.
Gendered Repression and Gendered Dissent
The Argentine case, along with many others, saw women taking to the streets
even as the regime was very repressive. This begs the question: why do women, in
particular, protest when the government is highly repressive? In this section, I argue that
state repression is gendered in practice, and as a consequence of this, has gendered
effects. In particular, when the state uses repression, it does so in ways that affect women
and men differently. Due to the different effects that repression has on women and men,
women’s reactions to repression, such as protesting, are different from the reactions of
men. Certain repressive tactics are more likely to be associated with women’s protests.
Here I focus on the use of forced disappearances, in particular, as there is clear historical
and contemporary evidence demonstrating gender’s role in shaping who is targeted for
disappearance and how victims and survivors respond. In this section I build upon both
grievance (Gurr 1968, 1970) and political opportunity structure (Tilly 1978, Costain
1992) models of protest to argue that forced disappearances can serve as a gendered
grievance, directly motivating protests by survivors, but that the actual practice of forced
disappearances present a gendered opportunity structure for mobilization.
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While both men and women could be motivated to protest by disappearances,
women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances, and men
will not be more likely to do so, for three reasons. First, disappearances are gendered in
their targeting, namely that typically men are victims of the practice and women were not
targeted as often, thus increasing the perceived cost of protest for men and reducing the
relative cost for women. Secondarily, women have unique advantages for mobilization in
the face of political disappearances relative to men. Due to the “shield” of their roles as
wives and mothers (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), women are able to protest when men
cannot.
What is Forced Disappearance?
Forced disappearance 3 is a particular type of repression that is particularly
egregious compared to other types of repression. According to international law, forced
disappearance refers specifically to
“… the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State … followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” (“International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance”
2006).
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Also called “enforced disappearance” or simply “disappearance”. In this dissertation, as
in other documents describing the process, “forced disappearance”, “enforced
disappearance”, and “disappearance” all refer to the exact same repressive practice.
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Forced disappearances were in many ways a repressive “innovation” of the Argentine
junta (Sikkink 2008) 4. While other regimes, like the Third Reich, had long practiced
disappearances of political rivals, the Argentine military developed a massive and wellorganized state apparatus to disappear people. It was Argentine human rights activists in
the late 1970s and early 1980s that first coined the phrase “to disappear someone” to
describe the clandestine political kidnappings used by the military regime (Sikkink 2011,
2008).
However, forced disappearance does not usually entail merely the violation of
habeas corpus, even though that on its own is deeply troubling. Typically, those targeted
by forced disappearance are actually subjected to a combination of other, concurrent
violations of their physical integrity rights. In practice, forced disappearances essentially
represent a combination of all three of the other types of repression. Forced
disappearance is a subtype of unlawful imprisonment, often politically motivated and
used against supposed “dissidents” (Navarro 1989). Once taken by the state, many
victims of forced disappearance are tortured (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). Nearly all those
targeted are eventually killed. Given these patterns, it is arguably true that forced
disappearance represents the worst possible physical integrity violation. Given the
severity of treatment of victims, understanding the effects of forced disappearances is
especially important, even as the practice has declined over time, and especially given the
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Other repressive practices associated with forced disappearances in Argentina were also
new, such as taking the babies of pregnant disappeared women, falsifying their identities,
and adopting them into military families (Sikkink 2008). Out of an estimated five
hundred babies taken in this way by the regime, only fifty had been found by their
genetic families as of 1993 (Wilson 1993).
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recent spread of the practice to countries like Syria (Amnesty International 2017) and the
Philippines (Bautista 2018).
Forced Disappearances as a Grievance against the State
Theories about protests and contentious mobilization often emphasize the role of
grievances that motivate certain people to act against the status quo (Gurr 1968, 1970,
Davies 1962). These arguments posit that government actions, particularly repression,
act as a major motivation for civil unrest (Carey 2006, Moore 1998) Disappearances,
like other forms of repression, can indeed serve as a grievance that motivates survivors to
act. This is because forced disappearances have particularly negative outcomes on
relatives of the disappeared, and thus may motivate them to action (Navarro 1989,
Sikkink 2008).
One unique factor about disappearance tactics relative to other repressive actions
are the targets of this repression (Sikkink 2008). Most of the victims of this type of
repression are young: in Argentina, over 80 percent of the victims were under 35
(Sikkink 2008). Recent accounts of both Colombia (Haugaard 2011) and Mexico
(Human Rights Watch 2014) suggest that victims there have also been relatively young.
In part because of the relative youth of victims, the use of disappearance tactics can have
particularly awful psychological effects on the families of victims (Sikkink 2008).
Because victims are typically young, very often the parents of the victim are still alive
and are left to try to piece together what happened to their child.
Jelin (1995) characterizes the loss of a disappeared child as “uncertain harm”: the
child is missing but family members do not know for certain whether they are alive or
dead. This “ambiguous loss” is similar to that experienced by families of military
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personnel who are missing in action, and is the most stressful type of grieving that people
face (Boss 1999), making it difficult for family members to move on with their lives
(Sikkink 2008). In instances when the whereabouts of a family member are known (for
instance, with “ordinary” political imprisonment) and/or their death is confirmed, this
ambiguity is absent. By contrast, in the face of the uncertainty caused by disappearances,
many family members of the disappeared in Argentina believed their children might be
alive and suffering, and this possibility motivated their activism because protesting could
potentially lead to the safe return of their children (Navarro 1989). Families turned to
activism as a coping mechanism to help deal with their uncertainty and grief when family
members went missing (Sikkink 2008).
H2 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced
disappearance as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced
disappearance.
However, it is important to note that the pain of the loss of a child through forced
disappearance is universal to men and women, mothers and fathers, and so we might
expect both women’s protests and broader social protests when the state uses
disappearances. Historically, however, this has not been the case, and primarily women
have been most active in protesting when the state uses forced disappearances (Navarro
1989, Schirmer 1989). This is due to two factors in the way in which forced
disappearance has been practiced by the state, which I elaborate on in the next section.
First, the practice of disappearances is gendered, and men are more likely to be
disappeared than women are. Second, women have the unique opportunity to utilize their
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identity as mothers and wives as a “shield” to provide space for them to protest (Navarro
1989, Schirmer 1989), which men cannot do.
Gendered Targeting of Forced Disappearances
In addition to grievance-focused theories of protest, other works emphasize the
opportunity structure within which individuals operate. These theories focus on the
opportunity to protest, rather than the motivation of a protest (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978,
Kitschelt 1986, Hirsch 1990, Costain 1992, Tarrow 1994, della Porta and Tarrow 2005,
2012, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, Meyer 2004). In other words, whether or not we
see protest depends, in part. on how much the state will tolerate dissent. When deciding
whether to protest, individuals estimate how likely the state is to repress them for taking
to the streets, based in part on how the state has reacted to dissent in the past
(Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010, Lichbach 1987).
The opportunity structure arguments are a major point of departure for my
argument: While men and women alike feel the grief and motivation to protest caused
directly by the disappearance of a loved one, the actual practice of disappearance alters
the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, for two reasons. First, as I outline
in this section, the state typically does not use disappearance against women. Second, as
I outline in the next section, women have the ability to politicize their gender identity,
and protest “as women”, when the state uses disappearances than otherwise. Due to these
two factors, women actually have more space to mobilize and protest when the state uses
disappearances than men do.
Disappearances are gendered in their targeting: men are more likely to be
disappeared than women are. Historical narratives from Argentina and other countries
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(Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), recent journalistic accounts (Human Rights Watch
2014), as well as available statistics on the genders of victims of forced disappearance all
support the assertion that women were less likely to be disappeared than men. The UN
reports that most reported cases of forced disappearance are of men, with roughly 70% to
94% of the disappeared being male, shown in Table 1 (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015). These
gender breakdowns are available primarily in the pre-democratization periods of open
civil conflict in the selected countries. These countries were selected due to data
availability: gender breakdowns of victims were not available in other cases (Dewhirst
and Kapur 2015).
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Table 1: Estimated Percentage of Victims by Gender, Selected Countries
Country
Women
Men
Argentina
30%
70%
Chile
6%
94%
Guatemala
12%
78%
Peru
15%
85%
South Africa
10%
90%
Note: Table adapted from Dewhirst and Kapur (2015).
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Also, consider evidence from the partial list of names of the disappeared in by the
“Proyectos Disapperacedos”, an NGO affiliated with FEDEFAM 5. The full list of names
of victims in both Argentina and Brazil is included in Appendix C. These lists are
obviously only a small sample of the total number of victims of forced disappearances in
those countries, but using these lists allows us to to gather some baseline information
about who was targeted by the regime.
Their list of victims in Argentina includes 1,898 total victims. I examine only the
first names listed, as those are most informative about the person’s gender. In Spanish
speaking cultures, feminine middle names are fairly common – many men have Maria as
a middle name, for example. The fifteen most common first names in the list, in order of
the number of appearances, were María, which appeared 81 times, followed by Carlos
and Jorge, both at 74 times each respectively, Juan at 72 times, José at 63 times, Luis at
50, Eduardo at 48, Miguel at 40, Roberto at 35, Ricardo, at 31, Daniel and Julio at 30
each, and Hugo at 28 times. Indeed, if we look at the 45 most common names, which I
have coded as male or female, we see that there were 928 male victims in the list but only
212 females, meaning that men were roughly 4.4 times more likely that women to appear
in the list.
In addition, since many Argentine names are Spanish in origin, and Spanish is a
Romance language with gendered nouns, it is possible to capture, loosely, the gender
composition of the list by checking for name endings. Names ending in “-o” are typically
assigned to males, and names ending in “-a” are more frequently given to women (though

5

Acronym for Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de DetenidosDesaparecidos, an organization that works to end the practice of forced disappearances.
49

not always). Here, again, we see that male names appear more commonly in this list of
victims, with 607 names ending in “-o” but only 476 first names ending in “-a”.
The list for Brazil is much smaller, including only 125 names. However, it is still
valuable information to analyze. In this list, among all the first names which appear more
than once, the most common name is José, which appears 9 times, followed by Antonio
at 7 times, Paulo at 6, João at 5, Maria at 3, followed by Daniel, Joel, Luis, Orlando,
Pedro, Rui, and Walter all appearing at 2 times each, respectively. This suggests that
male names appear roughly 16.7 times more frequently in this list than female names.
While Portuguese naming conventions differ slightly from Spanish, generally the rule of
“-o” as masculine and “-a” as feminine still applies. I find that names in this list end in “o” 52 times, but in “-a” only 14 times.
Taken as a whole, all the available evidence on the gender of victims of forced
disappearances suggests that the state does not target women as often as men, at least
with the use of forced disappearance. In part because many of the direct targets of
disappearance are male, many of the political effects of disappearance are gendered as
well. Men are taken more frequently, and women are thus more often left behind to piece
together what has happened.
Since women know that the state is less likely to target them, they would see this
context as an opportunity to protest with lower personal risks, increasing their likelihood
of protest (Tilly 1978). In other words, in states where forced disappearances are
common, the repressive tactics used by the state change the political opportunity structure
in a gendered way, encouraging women to protest but not encouraging men. In fact, one
member of the Madres articulated just this, saying “You have to leave.” to men who
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wished to accompany the mothers, “If there are only women, the police will not dare to
intervene, but if you come they will not hesitate to take you away” (quoted in Bousquet
1983, Navarro 1989). This affords women’s groups, in particular, a unique opportunity
to mobilize in the face of such repressive tactics. Unlike general protests, which would
usually include both men and women, women’s protests are less likely to be met with
repression. Thus, women and women’s groups may be able to protest when men cannot.
H3 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced
disappearance, but other protests will not be more frequent..
Women’s Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts
Finally, I wish to turn to examining decision point 4 from Figure 3, wherein
citizens decide whether to join a protest or not. I argue that in repressive contexts,
particularly situations where the state is using forced disappearances, women’s gender
identity constitutes a valuable political resource that can enable and incentivize women to
join protests. This means that the gender gap in participation between women and men
actually narrows under repressive contexts.
As social movement theorists often point out, political opportunities for protest do
not simply exist in the abstract. Activists must also perceive and/or construct those
opportunities for themselves (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012, 2005, Tarrow 2004,
Banaszak 1996). Here, too, there is reason to believe that forced disappearance changes
the political context in ways women, in particular, can utilize. The military regime in
Argentina used the ideal of the traditional family as a central metaphor, and the women of
the Plaza saw this as an opportunity to turn that message around against the state
(Navarro 1989). They subverted the regime’s message by exposing its hypocrisy in
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splitting up families. The Mothers used the nuclear family and motherhood in its
messages and public appeals (Jelin 2004). When the state uses forced disappearances
women also have unique opportunities to emphasize their position in society as women,
wives, and mothers (Mooney 2007, Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). In other words,
women can organize as a group strategically.
While much prior research focuses on the negative effects of gender stereotypes,
under certain circumstances, popular perceptions of women can also work to their
advantage (Barnes and Beaulieu 2016, Navarro 1989). Because of the ability to “shield”
themselves by politicizing their roles as wives and mothers, women were able to protest
when men could not (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989). Even in the context of mass
repression under military regimes, women in Argentina (Sikkink 2008), Chile (Noonan
1995, Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998), and other countries still took to the streets to
demand information on their children. This historical reality both challenges and
qualifies the political opportunity structure argument (Sikkink 2008): women mobilized
in spite of the fact that there was little to no chance for success in changing the regime’s
behavior. Critically, in a repressive context, these groups organized “as women”
strategically, and mobilized particularly as mothers, focused on the biological family and
the bond between mother and child (Sikkink 2008).
In part due to their ability to organize “as women” (Navarro 1989), and thanks to
the international attention to their cause (Mooney 2007), the state could not fully repress
women and women’s groups the way it could repress more general dissent. At a time
when thousands of men were disappearing, the government took only a small number
from the Mothers group. While disappearances of women did indeed happen, they were
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not nearly as frequent as one would expect given the widespread use of the practice. In
the face of political disappearances then, both because of their centrality to families that
the regime purported to value, and because of international attention to their cause,
women had better opportunities to oppose the regime openly than men had.
Heretofore, I have primarily discussed women as a group. In other words, to
borrow from rational choice terminology, I have made a “unitary actor” assumption about
women. In reality women come from all different economic classes, races and
ethnicities, social positions, geographies, and so on. Indeed, not all women are wives or
mothers, nor are they always perceived as such. However, the assumption of women as a
group is warranted by my argument for a number of reasons. While not all women are
wives or mothers, only women can be wives or mothers, at least according to the
traditional gender roles typically found in the region. Secondarily, when women are
protesting, it would be difficult or impossible for an outside observer to distinguish which
women are, in fact, wives or mothers, and which are not. Thus, while not all women are
wives or mothers, even those women who do not have children or husbands can
potentially join a protest of wives and mothers. Recall, for example, the reasoning of
Maria Antonieta Lugo, who was willing to join in a protest by local housewives because
she herself had male relatives the same age as those who had disappeared (Stevenson and
Sherman 2014). Even those without children could be persuaded by a similar logic, and
would be perceived similarly to other women in the protest by an observer even if they
did not have children.
While my earlier hypotheses focus on country level dynamics, ultimately they
require individual women to recognize and capitalize upon the political environment in
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which they find themselves. When the state does not use forced disappearance, in
general, women do not typically participate in politics at the same level as men (Córdova
and Rangel 2016, Beauregard 2013, Kittilson 2016, Espinal and Zhao 2015, Gallego
2015, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010, Desposato and Norrander
2009, Zetterberg 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).
Consider, for example, that women who had never been involved in politics prior to the
disappearance of their children originally formed the Mothers group in Argentina
(Navarro 1989). In sum, I expect that during “politics as usual” there is a gender gap
between men and women’s participation, and women are less likely to take part in
protest.
H4 – During times when the government is not very repressive, women will be
less likely to participate in protests compared to men..
However, when the state makes use of forced disappearance, it is likely that women will
recognize their lower risk for speaking out, their ability to organize as women, and the
additional space that this tactic can afford them to protest. Consequently, individual
women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances.
H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government
uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in
protests under those conditions.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have laid out my argument about the relationship between
women’s protests and state practices of repression. I have argued that repression by the
state is a key motivator for many protests by women, and that the practice of repression is
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gendered in meaningful ways. Due to the influence of gender on how states target
repression, I argue that society reacts in a gendered way. Forced disappearance, in
particular, targets men more frequently than women. Due to this, protests under
conditions where the state is disappearing citizens are more likely to be framed in
gendered terms, and women’s protests are more likely, while general protest should not
be more frequent in those conditions. Finally, due to women’s increased safety from
outright repression when the state uses disappearance, women are more likely to
participate in protests under those conditions.
Table 2 outlines my hypotheses, making clear what the comparison group
expectation is for each. H1 is that women should protest repression, and in this sense, I
argue that women’s protests are similar to general protests. H2 is that women’s protests
should be more frequence when the state uses disappearance. H3 is that general protests
should not be more likely when the state uses disappearance, because of how they are
targeted in a gendered way. H4 is that under non-repressive conditions, women should
be less likely to protest, and H5 is that women will be more likely to protest under
repressive conditions, compared to men.
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Table 2: Hypotheses
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

Women’s Protests
Women’s protests will be more frequent
when the state is repressive
Women’s protests will be more frequent
when the state uses disappearance
(See H2)
Women will be less likely to participate
in protest when the state does not use
disappearance
Women will be more likely to
participate in protest when the state uses
disappearance
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Comparison
Women’s protests are similar to other
protests
(See H3)
General protests are not more frequent
Men are more likely to participate in
protests when the state does not use
disappearance
Men are not more likely to participate
in protest when the state does not use
disappearance

Chapter 3 – Empirics: Women Protest Repression
In this chapter, I present empirical tests of my first major hypothesis, namely that
women’s protests are frequently motivated by repressive actions undertaken by the state.
I first present a test of H1 on a global sample of states from 1990-2012. Secondarily, at
the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of
regional variations.
As a reminder, the hypothesis tested in this chapter is as follows:
H1 – Women will protest more when the government is repressive than when the
government is not repressive.
Research Design
To test my first hypothesis, I utilize a time-series cross-sectional dataset of
women’s protests and covariates. These data cover the 1990 to 2012 period.
Geographically, these data cover all states recognized by the US Department of State,
whose reports are used to generate human rights violations data (Cingranelli and Richards
2010). The unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. “Chile-1995” is one unit).
My primary dependent variable to test H1 is a count of women’s protests in a
given year, which ranges from 0 to 205 (data from Murdie and Peksen 2014). Given the
nature of the dependent variable as a “count” of discrete events, the primary modelling
strategy used in this chapter (and the following chapter) is negative binomial regression
(King 1989). Negative binomial regression is a statistical modelling strategy used for
modeling a dependent variable which accounts for the non-linearity typically found in
count data (King 1989). In particular, negative binomial regression accounts for the fact
that count data is bounded by a floor at zero (a discrete event cannot occur fewer than 0
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times). This is preferable to a linear approach, like ordinary least squares (OLS) because
OLS becomes inefficient, inconsistent, and biased when it is applied to count data.
Additionally, negative binomial models account for two of the most common
issues with another common method for modelling count data, the Poisson regression.
The first is that unlike a Poisson model, negative binomial approaches account for overdispersion – a situation in which the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the
mean. The second is that Poisson approaches assume independence of the dependent
variable over time. Given that the dependent variable in question is over-dispersed,
negative binomial is more appropriate than Poisson. Secondarily, the dependent variable
is very likely to be dependent, rather than independent over time (one protest in a given
year probably increases the likelihood of more protests occurring within that year).
Additional testing on the dependent variable did not reveal significant zero-inflation.
Zero-inflation is a situation in which there are an unusual number of non-events in the
dependent variable, which are zeroes in count data, occur and can bias estimates
(essentially similar to the problem of modeling a “rare event” in a logistic regression).
Dependent Variable
The data on women’s protest come from Murdie and Peksen (2014): prior to
2014, no comprehensive cross-national data on women’s protests existed. They utilize
data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis database (IDEA 6) (Bond et al. 2003),
which is an automated coding of all events in the Reuters Global News Service,
organized into discrete “events” with information on “who did what to whom” for every

6

Note this is a distinct organization from the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, also called IDEA.
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recorded event (Murdie and Peksen 2014, King and Lowe 2003). For further discussion
of coding procedures (e.g. “why Reuters?”) see Murdie and Peksen (2014), p. 6. Prior
work using this dataset has focused on violent and/or nonviolent protests (Bhasin 2008,
Murdie and Bhasin 2011). In this chapter, I use a count of all women’s protests. This
value ranges from zero (i.e. no protests occurred in that year) in 1,890 cases to 205
protests in one case 7, with an average of about 5.2 protests in a given country-year.
Independent Variables
My theory predicts that women will protest under conditions of government
repression. To measure the independent variable of interest, I use the Cingranelli and
Richards (CIRI; 2010) Human Rights Data. Using the CIRI data is appropriate because
CIRI allows me to disaggregate their index and examine the impact of particular types of
repressive actions, which is not possible with other human rights data (such as PTS, see
Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010). The ability to break down
repression into its component practices is important for my theory, and critical for the
empirical tests I conduct in the next chapter. A descriptive breakdown of the types of
repression measured is presented in Figure 4. As you can see, torture has been the the
most common repressive tactic employed by states, with roughly 70% of all states still
using the tactic in 2010. Political imprisonment is also a commonly used type of
repression, with roughly 70% of states seeing use of this tactic in 1990. However, over
time the use of this particular type of repression has declined dramatically, with only
about 55% of states seeing use of the tactic in 2014. Extrajudicial killings are
consistently used less frequently than imprisonment or torture across time, but

7

The United States in 1998.
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nonetheless represent extreme disrespect for human rights when they are practiced in a
given state. Finally, forced disappearance is the least utilized, but arguably most severe,
form of repression. Its use has declined considerably over time, with about 58% of states
using the tactic in 1990 but less than 45% of states using it in 2010.
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Figure 4: Prevalence of Repression for All Countries by Repression Type

Notes: Data on repression types comes from CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). For
visualization purposes, a country is coded as experiencing a type of repression in a given
year if CIRI reported that a type of repression occurred “frequently” in a given country
for a given year, whereas a state is coded as not experiencing a repression type if CIRI
reports that type of repression only “occasionally” occurred, or did not occur, in a given
year.
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To test H1, I employ the additive Physical Integrity Scale. This variable is an
ordinal scale that ranges from zero to eight. I have rescaled the variable so that a score of
eight represents the “most repressive” government practices and zero represents “least
repressive”, for ease of interpretation. I do not lag this variable, as protests are generally
a rapid response to ground conditions, while all other time-varying covariates are
typically lagged by one year. This does lead to concerns for the possibility of
endogeneity, but I conduct additional tests to this end shown in the Appendix, and do not
find evidence of a reciprocal relationship.
Figure 5 shows the observed average number of women’s protests at varying
levels of state repression. In other words, the graph shows a simple bivariate regression
“line of best fit” between protests and repression. As you can see, the raw data suggests
that my expectation is supported. Without including any controls, we observe that
women’s protests do seem to increase in frequency as a state becomes more repressive.
However, we must account for the role of other variables that may affect this
relationship’s strength and significance. Thus I discuss the control variables employed,
and in the next section report a full model with controls.
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Figure 5: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Repression

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying
observed levels of state repression. Controls are not included.
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Controls
As mentioned earlier, Murdie and Peksen (2014) offer a global analysis of
women’s protest based on the three major theories of political mobilization: grievances,
resource mobilization, and political process. Grievance theories suggest that discontent
with the current political system leads to collective dissent (Davies 1962, Gurr 1968).
Thus, I want to control for whether the state respects women’s political equality (Murdie
and Peksen 2014). I control for this relationship by including the CIRI measure of
women’s political rights in my models. This scale ranges from zero (women’s political
rights are not guaranteed in law or practice) to three (women’s political rights are
guaranteed by law and are respected in practice). I expect a negative relationship: high
respect for women’s political rights should decrease the need for women to protest.
Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize
(rather than their motivation for doing so). Access to resources, such as financial and
organizational support, reduces the cost of mobilization and thus increases the likelihood
of protest (Tilly 1978, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Bell et al. 2013). To account for this
relationship, I control for the number of women’s INGOs (from Cole, 2013), and I expect
a positive relationship here: more women’s INGOs should ease the cost of collective
mobilization and lead to higher levels of protest. As a secondary measure, I use women’s
labor force participation. This measure is the percent of the total labor force that is
female, and I again expect a positive relationship.
Political process theories focus on the opportunity to succeed in a political goal.
Mobilization depends on a favorable political environment: individuals must have some
confidence they could succeed, and the government must be somewhat tolerant of dissent
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(Costain 1992, see also Tilly 1978, and Lipset 1963). Historical evidence suggests this
latter qualifier may not hold in the Latin American context: women could and did
organize in spite of massive repression from the government in Argentina and several
other countries. This is less problematic for my analysis because of the timeframe, as all
Latin American states had democratized to some degree prior to 1990. In order to
capture the effects of openness of the political system, I include a control for level of
democracy (Polity IV). Given there may be a “ceiling effect” (Murdie and Peksen 2014),
I test for robustness with a squared term (See Appendix A), and do not find substantively
different results.
Additionally, I include a dichotomous measure that captures whether a given year
contained a executive election. Elections have the potential to serve as “focal points” for
the opposition (Beaulieu 2014), and represent a period of political openness in which real
change is possible (Howard and Roessler 2006). Thus, I expect that high-profile
elections should exhibit higher levels of protest. From 1990 to 2012, a total of 432
executive elections occurred in the world. The data for election years comes from the
Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001).
I control for other contextual factors that might be important. The most obvious
are economic controls. Wealth, development, and inequality are important for
determining the level of protests we see in many contexts (Brancati 2013). Inequality
may lead to economic grievances, increasing protests. Wealth and development have less
clear-cut expectations: more wealth could provide more resources with which to protest,
but also remove cause for doing so. I control for these with the logged GDP of a country
in a given year, the logged GDP per Capita, growth in GDP from the previous year.
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Gender quotas have been on the rise across the globe since Argentina became the
first to adopt such a quota in 1993 (Jones 2009, Barnes 2012). Gender quotas could
represent a signal from the government that women’s participation in politics is valued,
encouraging them to mobilize. Thus, I control for the presence of a legislative gender
quota with a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for every year in which a quota
was in effect, and zero otherwise. This variable comes from Cole (2013).
I also control for women’s level of tertiary education. To the extent that we can
assume women are rational “unitary” actors, they would prefer to get their needs met
without having to take to the streets, because protesting is costly (see Beaulieu 2014).
One typical explanation for bargaining failure are information problems (Fearon 1995).
In low information environments, women and the state cannot send clear signals about
their preferences. As information increases, women are more able to use “regular”
channels to get information to the government. Following Beaulieu (2014), I proxy this
“information environment” by including a control for education. While education
provides resources for political participation (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995), I
expect it to encourage more “regular participation” like voting and direct women away
from protesting. I use the enrollment rates of women in tertiary education from the
World Bank as my measure. As education levels increase, protest should decrease.
Given that the protest data are based on media reports, I also want to control for
potential bias from news sources. Some countries may simply have more news stories
written about them due to their geopolitical importance, news audience taste, or some
other unobserved factors. To control for this possibility, I include a measure of media
bias, which captures the number of reports (in thousands) about a given country in a
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given year. This should reduce the possible bias towards more protests being reported in
more news-saturated countries. Given that the data are created from Reuters’ reports, and
the presence of foreign media has also been theorized to increase protest diffusion (see
Kern 2011), this control is especially necessary.
Finally, protests are likely to be auto-correlated. In other words, it is quite likely
that the protests we see in a given year are related to the protests seen in the previous
year. As such, I include a control for the number of women’s protests in the previous
year for each country (i.e. I include a lagged version of the dependent variable as an
independent variable). I expect a positive relationship here: protests in one year should
positively predict protests in the following year.
Results
Table 3 reports results for testing my first hypothesis. Recall that H1 is that
women will protest against state repression. I find support for this hypothesis: in both
models, state repression (as measured by CIRI’s physical integrity scale, inverted) has a
positive and significant impact on the number of women’s protests. To show this effect
visually, in Figure 6, I graph the predicted number of women’s protests by the level of
state repression (based on Model 2). As the state moves from no repression to the highest
level of repression, the predicted number of protests goes from approximately 2 protests
to anywhere in the range of 5-12 protests, an incredibly sizeable increase of at least
double the number of protests. In sum, I find strong statistical support in favor of H1.
Table 3 shows inconsistent evidence that levels of democracy matter. As
expected, the level of women’s education is negatively, significantly related to the
number of protests, suggesting that high information environments reduce overall levels
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of contention. I find that overall wealth predicts higher levels of protest, but that GDP
per capita predicts lower levels of protest. In robustness checks, I find that both
relationships are non-linear: increasing wealth and development both encourage
participation, but past a certain point the effects reach a ceiling (see Appendix B). I find
no evidence that women’s political equality, NGOs, labor participation, or gender quotas
matter for predicting women’s protests. Given that most of those factors are relatively
constant over time within countries, those null findings are not terribly surprising.
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression
Model 1
Model 2
Dependent Variable
Women’s Protests
Women’s Protests
Independent Variables
Repression

0.26***
(0.04)
0.04***
(0.01)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.04
(0.67)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.09)
-0.02**
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)

0.27***
(0.04)
Women’s Protests(t - 1)
0.03***
(0.01)
Women's Political Rights
0.03
(0.11)
Polity IV
-0.01
(0.02)
2
Polity IV
-0.00
(0.00)
Election Year
-0.00
(0.00)
Log GDP
-0.07
(0.74)
Log GDP2
0.01
(0.02)
Log GDP per Capita
-0.03
(0.10)
GDP Growth
-0.02**
(0.01)
Media Bias
-0.00
(0.00)
Women's INGOs
0.01+
(0.00)
% Labor Force Female
-0.01
(0.01)
Gender Quota
-0.21
(0.17)
Female Tertiary Education
-0.00
(0.01)
Observations
2725
2238
Pseudo R2
0.17
0.14
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, twotailed tests.
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Figure 6: Women’s Protests by Level of Repression

Notes: Predictions based on Model 2.
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Robustness Tests
I consider a number of additional checks and possible alternative explanations for
my findings. The first is that perhaps my findings are an artifact of the data I use to
measure repression. Though this is unlikely, I check for this possibility by using two
different additional measures of repression to ensure that my findings are robust to
different measurements.
In particular, I use two measures from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) data to
double-check my findings. The PTS data provides two measures of repression that differ
slightly because they are created from two sources: State Department country reports,
and Amnest International country reports (Wood and Gibney 2010). Unlike CIRI, which
uses both sources for one measure, PTS provides two separate measures, henceforth
called the Amnesty Scale and the State Department Scale. For both measures, the scales
range from 0 to 5. A score of 1 indicates a country “under a secure rule of law” wherein
people are not imprisoned for their views and torture/political murders are rare. A score
of 2 indicates that there is some imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but that
torture and political murders are rare. A score of 3 indicates extensive political
imprisonment, execution and political murder may be common, and unlimited detetion is
accepted. A score of 4 indicates that the practices of the previous score are expanded to
large numbers, and that murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life, but
primarily only for politically active citizens. Finally, a score of 5 indicates that these
repressive practices are extended to the entire population.
These measures differ from the similar CIRI repression scale in a few key ways.
First, it does not disaggregate repression by type – there is only a general scale of how
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repressive a state is, without data on specific state behaviors. Unfortunately, this means I
cannot use the PTS data for testing any hypoetheses except H1. Second, the PTS data
incorporates information about the scale of repression, whereas CIRI does not (Wood and
Gibney 2010). A higher score on the CIRI scale tells us that a state is practicing more
types of repression, whereas a higher score in the PTS data tells us that a state is
practicing repression against more people. Thus, if my theory is correct, I should expect
that the observed relationship between repression and women’s protests would be even
stronger using the PTS measures, as they better capture the scope of repression. Overall,
however, both the CIRI and the two PTS measures of repression are highly correlated, as
you can see in Table 4.
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Table 4: Correlation of Repression Measures
Physical Integrity
Amnesty Scale
Scale
Physical Integrity
Scale (CIRI)
Amnesty Scale (PTS) .7698
State Dept. Scale
.8085
.8137
(PTS)
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State Dept. Scale

-

As you see in Table 5, my findings are quite robust to these measures of
repression. Whether I use the data generated from Amnesty International reports (as in
Models A and B) or US State Department reports (Models C and D), I find that we
observe far more women’s protests the more repressive the state is. In fact, the most
striking thing about my findings is that aside from autocorrelation (the lagged measure of
women’s protests) and GDP growth, repression is the only significant predictor of
women’s protests, suggesting that repression might motivate women’s protests more than
any other country level factor.
I represent these findings graphically in Figure 7. As you can see, when the state
is not very repressive, the expected number of women’s protests is around two for any
given year. However, at the highest levels of repression, the expected number of
women’s protests increases dramatically to somewhere in the range of 8 to 12, a four-fold
increase at minimum. Repression remains an incredibly powerful predictor of women’s
protests, regardless of which measure I use to capture it.
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression (PTS)
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Dependent Variable
Women’s
Women’s
Women’s
Women’s
Protests
Protests
Protests
Protests
Independent Variables
Repression (Amnesty, PTS)
0.52***
0.52***
(0.06)
(0.07)
Repression (State Dep., PTS)
0.47***
0.48***
(0.06)
(0.07)
Women’s Protests(t - 1)
0.03***
0.03***
0.04***
0.04***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Women's Political Rights
-0.11
-0.01
-0.12
-0.02
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.11)
Polity IV
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
2
Polity IV
0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Election Year
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Log GDP
-0.17
-0.08
0.27
0.17
(0.63)
(0.73)
(0.68)
(0.73)
Log GDP2
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Log GDP per Capita
-0.11
-0.07
-0.08
-0.05
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.08)
(0.08)
GDP Growth
-0.02**
-0.02***
-0.01*
-0.02**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Media Bias
-0.00
-0.00
0.04+
0.02+
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.01)
Women's INGOs
0.01
0.01+
(0.00)
(0.00)
% Labor Force Female
-0.01
-0.01+
(0.01)
(0.01)
Gender Quota
-0.19
-0.20
(0.16)
(0.16)
Female Tertiary Education
-0.01
-0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
Observations
2395
1950
2701
2216
Pseudo R2
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, twotailed tests.
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Figure 7: Women’s Protest by Level of Repression, PTS Measures
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Note: Predictions based on Model 4 and Model 6, respectively. The predictions on the
left use the repression scale based on Amnesty International reports from the Political
Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010). The predictions on the right use the
repression scale based on US State Department reports from the Political Terror Scale
(PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010).
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In addition to measurement issues, we might also worry that this global approach
to analysis is missing some of the important regional variations in the relationship
between protest activity and repression. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007) point
out, regions of the world have particular dynamics and processes that are important
within those regions, therefore it is dangerous to assume causal hetereogeneity across
regions without taking precautions, and secondarily, political developments in one
country affect developments in nearby countries, leading to meaningful regional patterns
that may not be global in scale. In particular for this work, we might worry that the
theoretical framework I employ only applies to one particular region (Latin America), as
most of the cases I draw from are found in that region. If the relationship observed is
extremely strong, but only found in one region, a global analysis may still report a
significant coefficient, masking the fact that only one region fits the expected pattern.
In order to account for these possible pitfalls, I present in Table # analyses that fit
my general model to specific regions. In particular, I use the regions of the world and the
inclusion rules for which countries fit into which region as they are defined by the World
Bank (note that I do not run a model for the North American region, as it includes only
two countries, Canada and the United States). The regional groupings imployed are:
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and
the Pacific (EAP), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Given that I will use these regions again in later analyses,
here I provide an inclusive list of the countries that fall within each region in Appendix
A.
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In Table 6, I present these regional analyses. As you can see, repression generally
predicts women’s protests across regions, but the size and statistical significance of
repression varies greatly from region to region. In particular, no statistically significant
relationship is observed between repression and women’s protests in South Asia. This
may indicate a meaningful regional distinction, but this might also be caused by the
relatively fewer number of countries included within that region. I return to this fact in
the next chapter, dealing with repression types, in much more detail, but for now, I do not
find that only a single region is completely responsible for driving my findings. In
conclusion, based on these robustness tests, I do not find any empirical cause for concern
about the theoretical relationship I expected from H1: I find fairly consistent evidence
that women protest when the state is highly repressive, with the exception of South Asia.
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests by Repression (Regions)
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Dependent
Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s Women’s
Variable
Protests
Protests
Protests
Protests
Protests
Protests
Region
LAC
EAP
ECA
MENA
SA
SSA
Independent
Variables
Repression
0.20***
0.09*
0.22***
0.18**
0.18
0.28***
(CIRI)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.14)
(0.05)
Women’s
0.05***
0.03**
0.03***
0.03**
0.02*
0.03
Protests(t - 1) (0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
Women's
-0.51*
-0.09
-0.32
-0.26
0.54***
0.06
Political
(0.22)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.15)
(0.18)
Rights
Polity IV
-0.04*
0.04+
0.03
0.04
-0.02
-0.11***
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.01)
(0.03)
Polity IV2
-0.00
-0.00
-0.01
-0.00
0.03**
0.01
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Election
-0.00
-0.21
-0.00**
0.12
0.95***
0.01***
Year
(0.19)
(0.26)
(0.00)
(0.33)
(0.25)
(0.00)
Log GDP
2.90*
3.31**
-2.88**
1.94
13.50*** -0.90
(1.42)
(1.09)
(1.07)
(3.56)
(3.01)
(2.64)
2
Log GDP
-0.05+
-0.06**
0.06**
-0.03
-0.27***
0.03
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.06)
Log GDP
-0.48**
-0.26*
0.29
-0.29*
-0.04
-0.35+
per Capita
(0.18)
(0.11)
(0.24)
(0.14)
(0.38)
(0.18)
GDP Growth
0.01
0.02
-0.01
-0.03+
0.09+
-0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.05)
(0.01)
Media Bias
0.15*
0.03*
0.01
0.30**
0.01
0.28*
(0.07)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.11)
(0.01)
(0.13)
Observations
437
300
778
298
120
740
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.17
0.14
0.15
0.19
0.16
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, twotailed tests.
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Chapter 4 – Empirics: Women Protest Disappearances
In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H2 and H3, namely that women’s
protests are motivated by state use of forced disappearances in particular, but that forced
disappearances will not cause more protest in general, respectively. As with the last
chapter, I first present a test of my hypotheses on a global sample of states from 19902012. Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests,
including an analysis of regional variation.
As a reminder, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows.
H2 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance
as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced disappearance.
H3 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance,
but there will not be more protests from other groups.
Research Design
The research design employed to test my second and third hypotheses is similar to
the one described in the previous chapter. I again utilize a time-series cross-sectional
dataset of women’s protests and other country-level covariates. These data cover the
1990 to 2012 period, and are reported in Murdie and Peksen (2014). The unit of analysis
is country-year. My primary dependent variable to test H2 is the same as the data used
for H1, a count of women’s protests in a given year, and so the primary modelling
strategy is again negative binomial regression 8. H3, however, requires a different
dependent variable – a measure of general protests. I use data on general nonviolent
protests, also collected by Murdie and Peksen (2014), to test H3. Specifically, in this

8

Additional tests did not reveal significant zero-inflation.
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chapter I use negative binomial regression models to compare the predictors of women’s
protests to the predictors of general protests. Note that all significance tests reported are
two-tailed, and that figures show 84 percent confidence intervals (meaning that overlap
between confidence intervals should be interpreted as statistical insignificance). Here,
the main independent variable is a disaggregated measure of state use of forced
disappearance, which comes from CIRI. The disaggregated measures of repression
(including disappearance) are not lagged, due to the fact that protests are a rapid response
to current conditions, whereas all other time-varying covariates are lagged by one year to
help ease concerns about endogeneity. While this modelling decision does potentially
create concerns about endogeneity between the dependent variable and my primary
independent variables, I conduct further tests to examine this possibility and do not find
cause for concern about a reciprocal relationship.
Primary Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable, a count of women’s protests, is the same as
described in the previous chapter. For a more detailed discussion of this variable, see the
section Dependent Variable, in Chapter 3. This data comes from Murdie and Peksen
(2014), who provide a global events data measure of women’s protests. The data is a
count, ranging from 0 to 205, and thus the modeling strategy is again negative binomial
regression.
Secondary Dependent Variable
My theory suggests that women protest “as women” rather than as part of a more
general protest strategically. The empirical implication of my argument is that there will
be more women’s protests when the government disappearances (H2), but general
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protests are no more likely in those circumstances (H3). In order to test this hypothesis, I
wish to compare the predictors of women’s protests, specifically, to protests more
generally. To do this, I use the same IDEA database’s information on general nonviolent
protests. This dataset provides a count of all nonviolent protests, which were not lead by
women or women’s groups, in a given year. In other words, these are broader social
protests organized and carried out by both men and women.

I use this data on

nonviolent protests, rather than a sum of violent and nonviolent protests, due to data
availability limitations. Data on violent, general protests is not available from the same
source. While an imperfect comparison, because the women’s protest measure includes
both violent and nonviolent protests, these measures should give me a reasonable proxy
for overall levels of contention. However, comparing the two should not be problematic,
especially given that women are considerably less likely to support violent action in the
first place (see, for instance; Caprioli 2000, de Boer 1985, Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990,
Frankovic 1982, McGlen & Sarkees 1993, Mueller 1973, 1994, Shapiro & Mahajan
1986, Smith 1984, Togeby 1994). Using this variable, I can compare women’s protests
to general, non-violent protests by mixed gender groups, which can demonstrate which
circumstances lead to one type of protest vs. the other (or to both types).
Independent Variable
My theory predicts that women will protest when the state makes use of forced
disappearance, and that disappearances should correlate with women’s protests but not
general protests. To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and
Richards (CIRI, 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of
whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This measure takes a
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value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no
evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some
limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use disappearances. I
include the measures of the other repressive tactics (e.g. political imprisonment) as
control variables.
Figure 8 shows the average observed number of women’s protests at varying
levels of forced disappearance. In other words, it illustrates a “line of best fit” by
performing a simple bivariate regression of protests onto disappearances. This shows
graphically that the expected relationship between women’s protests and disappearance is
supported by the raw data. Women’s protests do, in fact, appear to be more frequent
when the state uses forced disappearance than when the state does not. Of course, this is
a “naïve” model without controls, but it is nonetheless suggestive that the expected
relationship is plausible.

83

Figure 8: Relationship between Women’s Protests and Disappearances

Notes: Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying
observed levels of disappearance. Controls are not included.
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Controls
In the analyses for H2 and H3, I include a number of controls thought to influence
women’s protests. These controls are largely the same as those described in the previous
chapter. For a detailed discussion of the measurement and expectations relevant to the
other control variables which are the same as those in Chapter 3, see the section Controls
in Chapter 3.
There are two new control variables to discuss for these models. First, my theory
focuses on the state practice of forced disappearance. However, there are other types of
repression that states employ which I wish to control for. To account for this, I include
the other three disaggregated measures of repression from CIRI. In particular, these
include a measure of whether a state practices torture, extrajudicial killings, and/or
political imprisonment. These are measured the same way that disappearances are
measure (i.e. 0 = no evidence of that repressive tactice, 1 = some use of the tactice, and 2
= widespread use of that tactice).
Second, when modeling H3, I want to account for the fact that women’s protest
and general protests might be highly related phenomena. Therefore, when modeling
women’s protests and general protests, I include lagged measures of both women’s and
general protests as control variables. This should alleviate concerns that the two
measures might be capturing the same process.
Results
Table 7 shows results for my models testing H2: that women protest more when
the government uses forced disappearances. Using the CIRI index for forced
disappearance, I find support for H2: the use of disappearances by the state is positively
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and significantly associated with women’s protests. Figure 8 shows this effect
graphically based on predictions from Model 14. As the level of forced disappearances
increases, the predicted number of women’s protests goes from 1-2 to 4-8; at least double
the number of expected protests by women. The finding that disappearances are
associated with higher levels of women’s protests is robust to many alternative modelling
specifications, as you can see in the Appendix.
Other types of repression besides forced disappearances are also associated with
increased numbers of women’s protests. In particular, extrajudicial killings and political
imprisonment are positively and significantly associated with more women’s protests,
whereas torture is only significant in the full model. I had no specific theoretical
expectations about these repressive tactics, but it is interesting to see them relate to
women’s protests as well. However, I should note that the regional analysis which
follows reveals that these relationships are inconsistent across regions.
Economic factors are also important. In particular, a growing GDP is associated
with fewer protests, suggesting again that women are less likely to protest when the
economy is improving. Surprisingly, and counter to my expectations, election years are
associated with fewer protests by women. Perhaps this is due to the fact that major
change is possible through voting, whereas protests are the only option for pressing
reforms forward when there is not an election in the near future. None of the other
controls I include show a significant influence.
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance
Model 13
Model 14
Dependent Variable
Women’s Protests
Women’s Protests
Independent Variables
Repression (CIRI)
Disappearance
0.34***
0.32***
(0.08)
(0.09)
Extrajudicial Killing
0.25***
0.23**
(0.07)
(0.07)
Political Imprisonment
0.28**
0.32***
(0.10)
(0.10)
Torture
0.15
0.21*
(0.10)
(0.09)
Women’s Protests(t - 1)
0.04***
0.03***
(0.01)
(0.01)
Women's Political Rights
-0.07
0.02
(0.10)
(0.11)
Polity IV
-0.00
-0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
Polity IV2
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
Election Year
-0.20*
-0.21*
(0.10)
(0.10)
Log GDP
0.11
-0.00
(0.64)
(0.72)
Log GDP2
0.01
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
Log GDP per Capita
-0.07
-0.04
(0.10)
(0.10)
GDP Growth
-0.01**
-0.02**
(0.01)
(0.01)
Media Bias
0.00
-0.00
(0.01)
(0.00)
Women's INGOs
0.01+
(0.00)
% Labor Force Female
-0.01
(0.01)
Gender Quota
-0.19
(0.17)
Female Tertiary Education
-0.00
(0.01)
Observations
2719
2235
2
Pseudo R
0.14
0.14
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, twotailed tests.
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Note: Predictions based on Model 14.
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Table 8 offers a test of my third hypothesis by comparing models of women’s
protest to models of general protest. In these models, I also include a control variable for
the lagged level of the other type of protest, because these processes could be highly
related. Indeed, the pairwise correlation for women’s protest and general nonviolent
protests is 0.513, which leads us to expect a positive relationship between the two.
Again, disappearances are a positive and significant predictor of women’s
protests, but do not show a relationship to general protests. Figure 8 depicts the
substantive effects of disappearances on the two protest types. As disappearances
increase, the expected number of women’s protests increases by a factor of about 1.7
times, but the number of general protests is not significantly increased or decreased. In
these models, none of the other types of repression matter for predicting either type of
protest.
Interestingly, neither type of protest is predicted by the other type in the full
model, in spite of their high correlation. This adds further support to the idea that
women’s protests are, in fact, very distinct from general protests, suggesting that the
conditions that lead to high levels of women’s protest are different from those that
increase general protests.
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Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of Protest Type on Disappearance
Model 17
Model 15
Model 16
Dependent Variable
Women’s
Women’s
General
Protests
Protests
Protests
Independent Variables
Disappearance
0.35***
0.34***
0.08
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.06)
Extrajudicial Killing
0.21**
0.20**
0.00
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.06)
Political Imprisonment
0.36***
0.35***
0.08
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.07)
Torture
0.20*
0.23*
0.09
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.06)
Women’s Protests(t - 1)
0.03***
0.03***
0.00+
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
General Protests(t - 1)
0.00
0.00
0.01***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Women's Political Rights
0.06
0.05
0.14+
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.09)
Polity IV
-0.00
-0.00
-0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Polity IV2
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Election Year
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Log GDP
-0.19
-0.18
1.31*
(0.66)
(0.72)
(0.64)
Log GDP2
0.01
0.01
-0.02
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Log GDP per Capita
-0.02
-0.01
-0.02
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.06)
GDP Growth
-0.01*
-0.01*
0.00
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
Media Bias
-0.03+
-0.03
-0.08***
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Women's INGOs
0.01+
(0.00)
% Labor Force Female
-0.01
(0.01)
Gender Quota
-0.12
(0.19)
Female Tertiary Education
-0.00
(0.01)
Observations
1988
1946
1842
2
Pseudo R
0.14
0.14
0.13

Model 18
General
Protests

0.08
(0.06)
0.00
(0.06)
0.12+
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.01***
(0.00)
0.03
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
1.53*
(0.70)
-0.02
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.06)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.07***
(0.02)
0.01*
(0.00)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.27*
(0.12)
0.01
(0.00)
1804
0.14

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.

90

Here, again, for both types of protest, economic factors are very important. GDP
exhibits a non-linear relationship with both women’s and general protests: at high and
low levels of wealth, protest is lower. GDP per capita, my proxy for development, shows
a depressing effect on women’s protests, and though negatively signed, GDP per capita is
not significantly related to general protests. Media bias also positively predicts both
types of protest, which is in line with expectations.
Interestingly, when controlling for the level of general protests, women’s labor
force participation becomes negative and significant for women’s protests. This may
indicate that when women have better access to the labor market they no longer organize
as women, but instead as part of broad-based protests. Women’s political rights
negatively predict general protests, perhaps for similar reasons: when women’s rights are
already respected, there is a lower demand for change.
Women’s INGOs do not significantly predict either women’s or general protests.
This is somewhat surprising given strong theoretical reasons to expect a positive
relationship. However, this null finding may simply be an artifact of two things. First,
by 1990, women’s INGOs may already have proliferated to the point of saturation, and so
INGOs had reached their “ceiling” for affecting the level of protests. In addition, the
level of women’s INGOs does not exhibit much change within countries over time (see
Appendix B), and thus can be thought of as close to constant. Levels of democracy,
elections, gender quotas, economic growth, and female tertiary enrollment do not exhibit
statistically significant relationships to either women’s or general protests. Again, these
factors are likely important globally, but may lack explanatory power within the region
and timeframe.
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Figure 9: Predicted Number of Women’s and General Protests by Level of
Disappearance

0

1
Disappearance (CIRI, rescaled)

0

2

1
Disappearance (CIRI, rescaled)

Notes: Predictions derived from Models 16 and 18, respectively.
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Robustness Tests
As in the previous chapter, I now present a few selected robustness tests. In
particular, Table 9 shows the models testing H2 applied to the regional subsets described
in the previous chapter. These models reveal that the relationship between forced
disappearance and women’s protests is in the expected direction in all regions analyzed.
However, this relationship fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance in the
South Asian region. Again, this might be due to meaningful regional differences, or
could be caused by the relatively fewer observations within that regional classification.
All in all, the findings are remarkably consistent across regions.
In Table 10, I show regional tests for H3. Recall that H3 suggests a null
relationship between disappearances and general protests. As expected, none of the
regional subsets demonstrate a statisticall significant relationship between disappearance
and general protests. Indeed, none of the other measures of repression appear to be
associated with higher levels of general protests either.
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Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance (Regions)
Region
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variables
Repression
(CIRI)
Disappearance

Model 19
LAC
Women’s
Protests

Model 20
EAP
Women’s
Protests

Model 21
ECA
Women’s
Protests

Model 22
MENA
Women’s
Protests

Model 23
SA
Women’s
Protests

0.49***
0.35**
0.37**
0.35*
0.14+
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.08)
Extrajudicial
0.03
-0.07
0.37**
0.05
-0.24
Killing
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.14)
(0.12)
(0.35)
Political
0.04
-0.13
0.31*
0.30+
0.58***
Imprisonment
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.18)
(0.16)
Torture
0.14
0.06
-0.17
0.09
0.78*
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.11)
(0.18)
(0.36)
Women’s
0.04***
0.03**
0.03***
0.03***
0.02*
Protests(t - 1)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Women's
-0.44*
-0.16
-0.42+
-0.28
0.55***
Political Rights
(0.21)
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.12)
Polity IV
-0.05***
0.04+
0.04
0.06
-0.01
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.02)
Polity IV2
-0.00
-0.00
-0.01
-0.00
0.02+
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.01)
Election Year
0.03
-0.15
-0.00+
0.14
1.07***
(0.20)
(0.19)
(0.00)
(0.32)
(0.19)
Log GDP
2.80*
4.16***
-2.75*
2.51
12.06**
(1.35)
(0.96)
(1.12)
(3.31)
(3.72)
Log GDP2
-0.05+
-0.07***
0.06**
-0.05
-0.24**
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.07)
Log GDP
-0.54**
-0.35*
0.21
-0.31*
-0.08
per Capita
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.25)
(0.13)
(0.35)
GDP Growth
0.01
0.02
-0.00
-0.04+
0.08
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.06)
Media Bias
0.17*
0.03*
0.01
0.28**
0.01+
(0.08)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.01)
Observations
437
300
775
300
120
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.18
0.14
0.15
0.20
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Model 24
SSA
Women’s
Protests

0.23*
(0.11)
0.34**
(0.12)
0.23
(0.16)
0.33+
(0.17)
0.03
(0.03)
0.07
(0.19)
-0.11***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00***
(0.00)
-0.92
(2.61)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.35+
(0.18)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.27*
(0.12)
740
0.16

Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression of General Protests on Disappearance (Regions)
Region
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variables
Repression
(CIRI)
Disappearance

Model 25
LAC
General
Protests

Model 26
EAP
General
Protests

Model 27
ECA
General
Protests

Model 28
MENA
General
Protests

Model 29
SA
General
Protests

0.09
0.15
-0.06
0.10
0.07
(0.13)
(0.17)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.05)
Extrajudicial
-0.04
0.16
-0.19
-0.18
-0.10
Killing
(0.16)
(0.12)
(0.17)
(0.12)
(0.10)
Political
0.07
0.19+
0.12
0.09
0.08
Imprisonment
(0.07)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.20)
(0.07)
Torture
0.11
-0.09
0.14
-0.05
-0.09
(0.10)
(0.17)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.07)
Women’s
-0.01
0.01+
0.01*
-0.01+
0.00+
Protests(t - 1)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Women's
-0.43**
0.14
-0.31+
0.05
0.14+
Political Rights
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.18)
(0.17)
(0.08)
Polity IV
-0.01
0.05**
0.03
0.01
-0.05***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.01)
Polity IV2
0.00
-0.01*
-0.01**
-0.01
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
Election Year
-0.02
0.06
-0.05
-0.19
0.31**
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.14)
(0.10)
Log GDP
4.82***
3.56**
2.00+
3.08
8.71***
(0.70)
(1.20)
(1.11)
(3.97)
(0.52)
Log GDP2
-0.09***
-0.06*
-0.03
-0.06
-0.17***
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.08)
(0.01)
Log GDP
-0.54**
-0.07
0.16
-0.20
-0.11***
per Capita
(0.19)
(0.10)
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.03)
GDP Growth
-0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
Media Bias
0.28**
0.06*
0.03**
0.40**
0.04***
(0.09)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.14)
(0.01)
Observations
300
204
527
198
82
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.14
0.10
0.12
0.26
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Model 30
SSA
General
Protests

0.00
(0.14)
0.07
(0.12)
0.08
(0.10)
0.23+
(0.14)
0.01+
(0.01)
0.27
(0.20)
-0.08**
(0.03)
0.01**
(0.01)
0.25
(0.15)
-0.57
(2.49)
0.02
(0.06)
-0.12
(0.16)
-0.00
(0.01)
0.15
(0.16)
500
0.11

Chapter 5 – Empirics: Women Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts
In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H4 and H5. H4 suggests that women
will be generally less likely to participate in protests, compared to men. H5, however,
suggests that this relationship between gender and protest participation is conditional on
state repression, specifically that women will be more likely to protest when the state
uses forced disappearances, but men will not. For this chapter, I use data from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test my final two hypotheses on a sample
of 18 Latin American countries in 2006 and 2008. In addition, I provide additional
robustness tests and alternative model specifications at the end of the chapter.
As a reminder, the two hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows:
H4 – During times when the government is not repressive, women will be less
likely to participate in protests compared to men.
H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government
uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in
protests under those conditions.
Why Latin America?
As mentioned, in this chapter I use survey data from Latin America to test my
arguments about the individual and state level factors that affect protest participation,
particularly gender and repression. I choose to study this relationship within the Latin
American region for a number of reasons. The first is that meaningful country level
variation is present in the timeframe. Secondarily, the substantive importance of both the
dependent and independent variable in the Latin American region cannot be understated.
Finally, for case selection purposes, limiting my analyses to the Latin American region
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allows me to control for potential unobservable confounding variables, such as the
historical legacy of American foreign policy during the Cold War, and the ongoing
regional conflicts surrounding the “War on Drugs”.
When looking at the Latin American region, women protest “as women”
frequently. Even in the post-military regime period (1990 to 2012), there is a great deal
of variation in women’s protest. Figure 10 shows trends over time in both women’s
protest and state’s disrespect for physical integrity rights, which graphically shows
evidence that women’s protests seem to be associated with high levels of government
repression. With both measures, a higher score represents higher rates of protest and/or
higher levels of repression. In terms of women’s protest, Colombia and Peru stand apart,
showing massive waves of women’s protest, whereas Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have
seen middling levels of women’s mobilization, and many other Latin American states
saw little protest over time from women. For the most part, those states with poor
physical integrity rights also had high levels of women’s protests.
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Figure 10: Women’s Protests and State Repression in Latin America, 1990-2009

Note: Women’s protest is a count of all protests by women in a given country-year. The
measure of repression is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index. This comes from
Cingranelli and Richards (2010), and scores range from 0-8, transformed so that a higher
score means greater state repression.
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In this chapter, I focus on the relationship of women’s protests and repression in
the Latin American region. There are compelling reasons to limit the scope to this
region, and these reasons broadly fall into normative and research design motives.
Turning first to normative reasons, further exploring both the dependent variable
(women’s protests) and the independent variable (repression) are critical for our
understanding of Latin America. As you can see in Figure 10, women’s protests are
fairly common in the region from 1990 to 2010. Given that protests are costly, both for
participants and for governments, understanding what causes women to protest is
critically important.
Women’s protests are especially important in the Latin American context because
historically women’s participation has played a critical role in the democratization
process that began in the late 1970s (Baldez, 2003, 2002, Navarro, 1989, Schirmer,
1989). Even as the government was highly repressive of opposition, women in Argentina
(Navarro, 1989), Guatemala, and Uruguay (Schirmer, 1989) took to the streets to demand
information about their missing children. These women’s protests took place because of
– and in spite of – massively repressive government regimes that were “disappearing”
thousands of citizens at the time. The history of the region shows that women’s political
involvement can play a crucial role in creating social change.
Indeed, not only are women’s protests important in Latin America, but repression
has been a major issue for many countries there as well. During the period of military
rule, many countries in Latin America experienced a great deal of physical integrity
rights violations. Even in the post-democratization period, repression is common in Latin
American countries. For example, even from the period of 1990-2010, more countries
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than not experienced at least one year in which there was some use of the practice of
forced disappearances (see Figure 10).
In addition to the normative importance of understanding the relationship of
women’s protests to repression in the region, isolating my analysis to Latin America is
also advantageous from a research design perspective. In order to test my argument, I
need a large number of countries over a long period of time with variation on both the
dependent variable and the independent variable. Latin America provides both:
women’s protests are fairly frequent but vary widely by country and over time, and
repression occurs relatively often in many different countries but not in every year.
Secondarily, limiting the scope of this aspect of my study to Latin America allows
me to control for many variables that might confound the relationships I seek to isolate.
For example, many countries in the region have had similar historical experiences, from a
shared colonial heritage as largely Spanish colonies, to a long period of military rule, to
more recent shared experiences such as the “Left Turn”. Given the similarities among
countries in Latin America, differences in levels of women’s protests between countries
are less likely to be a result of differences in things like culture or general acceptance of
unrest.
Research Design
While the dependent variable at the country-level utilized by the preceding
empirical chapters represents an excellent opportunity to analyze women’s protests at the
aggregate level, and to compare women’s protests to more general protests, we may
worry about relying on this measure alone for a few reasons. First, my theory suggests
that there are individual level factors at play. H4 and H5 operate at the level of
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individuals deciding whether to participate in protests or not. If, at the country level,
more protests by women were recorded when the state made use of forced disappearances
but women, individually, were not more likely to protest under such circumstances, that
might suggest that only motivated activists and those most directly affected by
disappearances turned out in protest, but women generally were not more politically
outspoken in those conditions. The second concern is the possibility of an “ecological
fallacy” (c.f. Seligson 2002). Particularly, in this case we are concerned with the
“individualistic fallacy”, wherein we falsely infer patterns at the individual level from
aggregated data. Because my theory relies on both individual and country level
dynamics, it should be further strengthened by investigating individual-level variation.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, used to test H4 and H5, relies on self-reported
information about individual protest participation from the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP) for the years 2006 and 2008. While these data cover fewer
years than the country level data, there is coverage of all the countries in the region.
Importantly, they also exhibit variation on the primary country-level independent
variable, the use of forced disappearance. Ten countries in the region experienced at least
some use of forced disappearances during at least one of those two years, and Colombia
experienced a high number of disappearances in both years.
This variable is coded as follows. Respondents were asked: “[…] Thinking about
the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?” The
variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in a protest in the last 12
months (at the time of the interview), and 0 if they had not. This variable allows me to
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compare both women’s and men’s reported protest activity. Given that this variable is an
individual level one, but my primary independent variable and several important controls
are country level variables, the following analysis uses multi-level logistic regression,
and again all tests are two-tailed.
Primary Individual Level Independent Variable
My theory predicts that not only will women’s groups and women activists protest
when the state uses forced disappearances, but that individual women also perceive their
relative advantages and women will thus be more apt to protest than men under these
conditions. In other words, my theory implies a cross-level interaction between gender
and the state’s use of forced disappearance. When the state uses disappearances, I expect
that women will be more likely to protest than when the state does not use disappearance.
Men, however, should not be more apt to protest under those conditions. In order to test
this conditional hypothesis, I interact both the country level disappearance variable from
CIRI (2010) and the individual respondent’s gender.
Country Level Independent Variable
My theory predicts that women will be more likely to participate in protest when
the state makes use of forced disappearance. To measure this independent variable, I use
the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI; 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides
a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year. This
measure takes a value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero
represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one
indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use
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disappearances. This variable is interacted with a respondent’s gender to observe
whether the effects of disappearance at the country level are conditional on gender.
Controls
Since this analysis includes individual level data, I am able to control for
additional individual level factors that might influence protest participation. I include a
control for respondent’s age, as well as a squared term for age. I control for the
respondent’s marital status. I control for the level of education that a respondent has
attained (primary, secondary, college, and post-graduate). I also control for whether the
respondent lived in a rural or urban area. People living in cities likely have easier access
to public spaces where protests typically occur, and consequently a larger potential
audience.
Socioeconomic status has long been theorized to influence political participation
broadly (e.g. Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995) and economic factors are known to
influence protest activity (e.g. Brancati 2013). For personal socioeconomic status, I use
the quintiles of wealth measure developed by Córdova (2009). This measure relies on
physical household assets (e.g. the number of vehicles), and is preferable to an outright
measure of income, because of a large non-response bias on standard income questions,
particularly with LAPOP data (Córdova 2009). This provides a reasonable metric of how
poor/wealthy a respondent is, in relation to their social context. In addition, I control for
the respondent’s current employment status.
Additional controls for respondent ideology and subjective measures of economic
and personal satisfaction are also included. I include controls for whether respondent
feels their personal economic situation has declined in the last year, whether they
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believed the country’s economic situation has worsened in the past year, and their current
level of satisfaction with life in general. These first two would motivate more protests,
whereas a generally satisfied respondent is probably less likely to protest.
Results
Individual-level analyses reveal similar dynamics to the country level. As
predicted by H4, women are generally less likely to protest when the state is not
repressive. The use of disappearances, however, changes the effect of respondent gender.
Under conditions of repression, women become more likely to protest than before. In
fact, as seen in Figure 12, the gender gap in protest participation at the individual level
disappears, and nearly reverses and becomes positive, when the state is using forced
disappearances. In other words, women are at least as likely (and very nearly more
likely) than men to protest when the state uses disappearance. Individual women do
seem to recognize that they have a higher ability to protest in this repressive context.
As for individual control variables, age appears to matter in some models but not
others. Generally, this variable suggests that the very young and very old are less likely
to protest than those in the middle age group are. Married people do not show any
significant difference in protest participation relative to single people. Those with more
education do tend to protest more often than those with lower education levels. Right
wing respondents were less likely than those on the left to protest. Subjective feelings
about the country and one’s personal economic situation do not appear to relate to protest
participation, but overall satisfaction with life does lower the likelihood of protesting.
At the country level, media bias towards a country is associated with a higher
level of protests among respondents. The level of democracy, captured by Polity, does
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not have significant effects, but this is not surprising given that only two years are
captured and so there is not much variation. For this cross-section, overall GDP is
associated with higher protests at the very high and low ends of the spectrum, with fewer
protests in the middle range. Finally, GDP per capita has a depressing effect:
respondents in more developed countries tend to show lower levels of protest.

105

Table 11: Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Covariates
Independent Variables
Model 31
Model 32
Model 33
Cross-Level Interaction
Female
-0.243***
-0.218***
-0.191***
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.044)
Disappearance
-0.661***
-0.407***
0.288**
(0.146)
(0.140)
(0.143)
Female X Disappearance
0.181**
0.165**
0.197**
(0.078)
(0.077)
(0.079)
Individual Level Variables
Age
0.017**
0.013*
0.003
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Age2
-0.000***
-0.000***
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Married
0.033
0.035
0.037
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.044)
Education Level
0.166***
0.159***
0.143***
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.020)
Wealth (Quintiles)
0.016
0.019
0.026*
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
Employed
-0.151***
-0.081*
0.079*
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.047)
Rural
-0.009
-0.012
0.017
(0.045)
(0.045)
(0.046)
Right Wing
-0.040***
-0.038***
-0.026***
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.008)
Personal Economy
-0.004
0.000
0.002
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.027)
Country Economy
0.021
0.021
0.016
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.023)
Life Satisfaction
-0.093***
-0.092***
-0.091***
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.025)
Country Level Variables
Media Bias
5.975***
5.262***
3.639***
(0.557)
(0.531)
(0.547)
Repression
-0.467***
(0.083)
Polity IV
7.216
(5.297)
Polity IV2
-0.548*
(0.313)
Log GDP
-127.398***
(8.578)
Log GDP2
2.479***
(0.174)
Log GDP per Capita
Constant
Observations
Number of groups
Chi2
P > Chi2

-3.243*** -25.894
(1.118)
(21.746)
19,299
19,299
18
18
445
< 0.001

522
< 0.001

Model 34
-0.203***
(0.044)
0.209
(0.151)
0.181**
(0.078)
0.004
(0.007)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.053
(0.044)
0.131***
(0.020)
0.028*
(0.015)
0.052
(0.047)
0.001
(0.046)
-0.030***
(0.008)
-0.017
(0.027)
0.017
(0.023)
-0.078***
(0.025)
2.433***
(0.550)

-7.195***
(0.617)
1,624.988***
56.129***
(105.517)
(5.267)
18,102
18,102
17
17
787
< 0.001

562
< 0.001

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.
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Figure 11: Effect of Respondent Gender on Likelihood of Protest Participation at Levels
of Disappearance

Note: Predictions in this figure derived from Model 34.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
This dissertation is an exploration of women’s protests that seeks to both shed
light on the unique role of gender in shaping protest behavior while also recognizing the
similarities between women’s protests and other forms of contentious mobilization. In
this concluding chapter, I summarize the major and minor contributions of this project as
I see them, I provide some of my ideas for building upon this foundation in future work,
and I reiterate the importance of continuing to study women’s protests.
Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation presents a big picture view of women’s protests. Using the
general theoreatical framework I develop in Chapter 2, I derive expectations about
contexts in which women’s protests are similar to other protests, as well as uncovering
contexts in which women’s protests are unique. Women protest repression just as other
groups do. However, when repression is gendered, and society is especially patriarchal,
women are paradoxically empowered by their previously detrimental gender roles. The
ability to politicize womanhood and motherhood serves as a crucial shield that protects
women and encourages them to protest “as women” rather than as part of broader
protests.
This dissertation demonstrates the critical importance of state repressive practices
for understanding women’s protests, specifically. This is both a contribution to our
understanding of women’s protests, but also a contribution to the study of the effects of
repression. Previous works in this area have generally undervalued the role of gender in
dissent, but this project demonstrates that both theorizing about gender and women’s
participation are critical for understanding dissent in repressive contexts.
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To my knowledge, this is the first project to examine women’s protests at two
levels – utilizing both globally comprehensive data on women’s protests at the countryyear level as well as regionally exhaustive individual level data on women’s participation
in protests. This is an important departure from previous works because it allows us to
examine whether patterns observed at the country level really hold at the individual level
(c.f. Seligson 2002). For example, when I observed in Chapters 3 and 4 that women’s
protests become more numerous in repressive states, it might have been the case that only
some women were more likely to protest in those contexts. However, in Chapter 5, I find
that this pattern actually holds for women in general, and that all women become more
likely to protest under repressive contexts, compared to men.
Indeed, to my knowledge, this is the first large scale research endeavor that
explicitly models the links between state level human rights practices to individual level
behaviors and attitudes. This is a major contribution to the study of human rights,
because many of the extant theories on human rights rely on assumptions about how
citizens perceive and respond to state actions, but do not explicitly test those
assumptions.
For example, many previous works on repression assume that citizens generally
respond negatively to repression. However, preliminary analysis made possible by my
data collection and multilevel modelling efforts has demonstrated that this assumption is
questionable, at least within the Latin American context. Consider the following
graphical representation. Using a similar model to the ones developed in Chapter 5, I
model citizens’ predicted level of trust in government at varying levels of state
repressiveness, interacted with citizens’ self-reported level of right-wing ideology. As
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you can see, when the state is not very repressive, there is no difference in level of trust in
government between left- and right-wing citizens. However, at middling and high levels
of repression by the state, more right-wing citizens actually report much higher levels of
trust in government, compareted to left-wing citizens. This analysis is obviously very
preliminary and needs a great deal of elaboration, but this is the kind of question that my
approach will allow us to answer more fully in the future.
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Figure 12: Trust In Government over Ideology and Repression

Linear Prediction, Fixed Portion
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8

Predicted Level of Trust in Government

1

Right Wing Ideology Scale
State Unrepressive
State Very Repressive

10

State Middling Repressive

Note: Predictions derived from mixed effects logit model, including all controls, as seen
in previous chapter.
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Avenues for Future Researh
One clear avenue for further work is to examine is to examine the decision
process of the state in choosing to repress and practicing repression. This project
demonstrates that gender and attitudes about women play a role in both of these
processes. However, it is still unclear what the full role of gender is in determining state
repressive behavior. Future works should take up the task of theorizing state repressive
behavior through the lense of gender.
As I mentioned in the previous section, future avenues for research linking
individual citizen attitudes and behaviors to state level repressive practices are fruitful
grounds for much future work. I have demonstrated one such area, but there are likely
hundreds more questions we could ask using this approach. How do citizens feel about
repression? Are the effects gendered in other ways, outside of protest behavior? What
citizens support the regime in spite of human rights violations, and why? These are all
incredibly interesting topics for future research to tackle.
Why Still Study Women’s Protests?
Normatively speaking, women’s protests are incredibly important. This has never
been more obvious than in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president of
the United States. Not even 24 hours after he was sworn in, a massive wave of protests,
primarily organized by and for women, exploded both in Washington D.C. and cities both
across the US and around the world. Women on all seven continents (including
Antarctica) marched in solidarity against the new administration. While clearly a very
different situation from women protesting in a highly repressive context, the logic of my
argument can still shed light on this wave of protests. In this case, the loss of an election
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and the transition to a more hostile new administration, rather than outright repression, is
the motivating grievance that drove over 4 million women to the streets in protest.
In what ways did the political climate favor women, specifically, to organize?
While I think we need to think more on this, it was probably because of the framing of
the campaigns. This campaign was different in that it was the first time a woman was
running on a major party ticket for the general election. Secondarily, much of the
campaign season was spent litigating gender issues on both sides (for Hillary, Bill’s past
infidelities and her reaction to those things, and for Trump, litigating his alleged
misogyny and many accusations of past sexual misconduct towards women). This
gender focus on the campaign trail probably helped to bring gender issues to the
foreground after the election in way that favored women organizing specifically around
their gender.
In addition, another important implication of my work is that repression is
gendered, and that both governments practicing repression do so in a way that reflects
and reinforces gender structures, and that men and women experience government
repression differently as a consequence of this. Governments typically hesitate to
disappear women because they view women as non-threatening and politically powerless.
However, this perception is false, and
My research could be very useful in studying “like cases”. In particular, the
current political situation in the Philippines comes to mind. Based on my argument, I
would suspect that women and women’s groups are likely to be the most active in
fighting against Duterte over the disappearances and other massive human rights
violations that are ongoing due to his “drug war”. Human rights groups, other nations,
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and international actors of all kinds should anticipate that it may be women, in particular,
who are the key to changing that state’s behavior. They should also do as much as they
can to mitigate the danger to women’s groups and women activists on the ground and
provide them with support and resources for mobilizing.
All this is to say that women’s mobilization is frequent, it is critically important
for calling out human rights violations and for democratization efforts, and it is not going
away any time soon. Understanding women’s protests is a supremely important endeavor
for scholars of gender, of protests, of human rights practices, of democracy, to
collectively undertake. This project is meant to advance our knowledge of women’s
protests in some small way, but also to provide a stepping stone for future work on the
subject to build, debate, and improve upon.
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Appendices
Here you can find the appendices for this dissertation. Appendix A includes both
descriptive statistics and visualizations of data used in the empirical chapters, as well as
supplementary information about question wordings. Appendix B includes additional
robustness tests for my models of H1-H5 which are not reported within their respective
empirical chapters. Finally, Appendix C includes a partial list of names of the victims of
forced disappearance in Argentina and Brazil during the military regimes in those
respective countries. These can be used to replicate the gender information found in
Chapter 2.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics
Table A1: Regional Composition
Region Name
Countries Included
Latin America
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
and the
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Caribbean
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti,
(LAC)
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
East Asia and
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, South
Pacific
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia,
Myanmar, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and
Vanuatu.
Europe and
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,
Central Asia
Bosznia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
(ECA)
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan.
Middle East and Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
North Africa
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
South Asia
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
(SA)
and Sri Lanka.
Sub-Saharan
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Africa (SSA)
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
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Figure A1: Average Global Level of Democracy over Time
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Note: Data comes from Polity IV. Scores range from -10 (least democratic) to +10
(most democratic).
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Figure A2: Global Number of Women’s INGOs over Time
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Note: Data on number of women’s INGOs comes from Cole (2013).
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Figure A3: Average Global Respect for Women’s Rights over Time
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Note: Data comes from CIRI (2010). Scores range from 0 (None of women’s political
rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of
women in the political process.”) up to 4 (“Political equality is guaranteed by law and in
practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or
in other high-ranking government positions”).
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Appendix B: Additional Robustness Tests
Table B1: Logistic Regression of Increased Repression on Covariates
Model 35
Model 36
Model 37
Independent Variables
Women’s Protests(t)
Women’s Protests(t-1)
Polity IV
Polity2
Presidential Election
Log GDP
Log GDP2
Log GDP per Capita
GDP Growth
Constant

-0.004
(0.003)
-0.021***
(0.007)
-0.005***
(0.001)
0.116
(0.112)
-1.353***
(0.406)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.009
(0.048)
-0.014
(0.009)

-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.007)
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.103
(0.110)
-1.467***
(0.424)
0.029***
(0.008)
0.004
(0.048)
-0.011
(0.009)

0.009
(0.006)
-0.016**
(0.006)
-0.020***
(0.007)
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.107
(0.110)
-1.415***
(0.420)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.009
(0.048)
-0.010
(0.009)

16.621***
(4.942)

17.814***
(5.142)

17.229***
(5.099)

Observations
3,302
3,168
3,168
2
Psuedo-R
0.024
0.023
0.023
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: In these models, I check for endogeneity. Here, the dependent variable is
increased repression, which takes a value of 1 if the current level of repression is higher
than the previous level in a given country, and 0 otherwise. Neither the current year’s
number of women’s protests nor the previous years number of women’s protests predict
an increase in repression, suggesting that endogeneity is not a huge concern for H1.
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Table B2: Civil Conflict
Independent Variables
Disappearance
Civil Conflict
Polity IV
Polity2
Presidential Election
Log GDP
Log GDP2
Log GDP per Capita
GDP Growth
Constant

Model 38

Model 39

Model 40

0.333**
(0.136)

0.340**
(0.134)

-0.003
(0.022)
0.007
(0.004)

-0.025
(0.025)
-0.002
(0.006)

1.249
(0.900)
-0.020
(0.019)
0.063
(0.119)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.027
(0.141)
-17.075
(10.960)

0.474
(1.029)
0.002
(0.022)
-0.320***
(0.114)
0.027
(0.027)
-0.247
(0.171)
-9.596
(12.318)

0.275**
(0.122)
1.230***
(0.302)
-0.021
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.166
(0.147)
0.803
(0.911)
-0.005
(0.019)
-0.253**
(0.100)
0.026
(0.026)
-13.574
(10.871)

Observations
431
2,311
2,756
Psuedo-R2
0.057
0.11
0.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
One concern for H2 is that disappearances largely occur in the context of civil conflict,
and so we might be capturing the effect of civil conflict with the disappearance measure.
I use the PRIO measure of civil conflict here (0 if no conflict, 1 if more than 25 battle
deaths occur). These two events are highly correlated, so including both in a model
introduces collinearity. However, when I isolate the sample to only ongoing civil
conflicts (Model 38), only non-civil conflicts (Model 39), or simply include both in one
modle (Model 40), I find that disappearances still have the expected positive relationship
with women’s protests.
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Appendix C: Names of the Disappeared

Américo Gines Agüero
Tomás Rodolfo Agüero Ríos
Ana Teresa del Valle Aguilar

Names of victims of forced

José Aguilar Bracesco

disappearance, for data verification.

Claudio Reyes Ahumada

Presented here in their memory.

Alejandro Fabian Aibar
Angela María Aieta de Gullo
Liliana Ester Aimeta

Argentina

Cherif Omar Ainie Rojas

Juan Carlos Abachian

Carlos César Aiub

Ana Catalina Abad de Perucca

María Concepción Aiub

Dominga Abadía Crespo

Ricardo Emir Aiub

Felicidad Abadía Crespo

Leticia Akselman

José Abdala

Genaro Alarcón

María Leonor Abinet

Carlos Esteban Alaye

Angel Luis Abraham

Pablo Eduardo Albarracín

Hernan Abriata

Roberto Omar Albornozr

José Ismael Acevedo

José Antonio Alcaraz Gonzalez

Dora Acosta

Domingo Alconada Moreira

María Eliana Acosta Velasco de Badell

Jorge Eduardo Alday Lazcoz

Elba Eva Acuña de Sáez

Segundo Sixto Alderete

Marta Graciela Acuña

Fernando Antonio Alduvino Bolzan

Sirena Acuña

José David Aleksoski

Oscar Adamoli

Alberto Cayetano Alfaro

Rolando Elías Adem

Alicia Elena Alfonsín

Claudio César Adur

Carlos Alberto Almada Villalba

Padre Jorge Oscar Adur

Elvio Alberto Almada

Nelson Roberto Agorio

Ricardo Avelino Almaraz

Hugo Agosti
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Guillermo Abel Almarza

Carlos Alberto Andisco

Alejandro Almeida

José Eduardo Andrade

Mónica Almirón de Lauroni

Jorge Luis Andreani

María Gloria Alonso Cifuentes de
Sánchez

Juan Carlos Andreotti
Luis Alberto Angelini

Mirta Alonso de Hueravilo

Blanca Estela Angerosa

Raúl Alonso

Daniel Martín Angerosa

Julio Antonio Altamirano

Humberto Orlando Annone

Lucio Bernardo Altamirano

Héctor Alberto Antelo

Dominga Alvarez de Scurta

Daniel Antokoletz

Federico Eduardo Alvarez Rojas

Néstor Rubén Antoñanzas

Gerardo Julio Alvarez

Arturo Apaza

Horacio José Alvarez

José Luis Appel De La Cruz

Jorge Alberto Álvarez

Francisca Aragón

José Carlos Alvarez González

Lidoro Oscar Aragón

Julio Rolando Alvarez García

Raul Araldi

Lucina Alvarez de Barros

Juan de Dios Aramayo Vallejos

Marcelino Alvarez

Isauro Arancibia

Osvaldo Angel Alvarez Alvarez

Napoleón Argentino Araneda

María Cristina Alvira

Juan Cesáreo Arano

Raquel Alvira

Héctor Antonio Araujo

María Elena Amadio

Wenceslao Araujo

Fernando Adolfo Amarilla

Miguel Sergio Arcuschin

Guillermo Amarilla

Hugo Ardiles

Nelly Ana Amato de Risso

Nélida Beatriz Ardito

Norberto Félix Amarturi

Roberto Ardito

Salvador Leonardo Amico

Luis Ramon Aredez

Lidia Inés Amigo

Alberto Francisco Arenas

Aníbal Alberto Anchepe
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Salvador Manuel Arestín

Pablo G Athanasiu Laschan

Joaquín Enrique Areta

Alfredo Apeleister

Jorge Ignacio Areta

Nicodemus Apeleister

Alberto Arévalo

Jorge Omar Astudillo Galizia

Alfredo Arévalo

María Inés del Cármen Atim

Antonio Arévalo

Abdala Auad

Domingo Arévalo

Roberto Eduardo Aued

Emilio Confesor Arévalo

Floreal Edgardo Avellaneda

Roberto Arfa

Lucrecia Mercedes Avellaneda Quintale

Jorge Raúl Arfuch

Jorgelina Aquilina Avalos de Gómez

María de las Mercedes Argañaraz de
Fresneda

Sara Fluvia Ayala de Morel
Vicente Ayala

Carlos Enrique Arias

Camila Elisabet Azar

Florentino Arias

Emilio Azurmendi

Segundo Bonifa Arias

Esteban Benito Badell

Julio César Arin Delacourt

Julio Aníbal Badell

Joaquín Ariño

Jorge Luis Badillo

Carlos María Aristegui

Miguel Ángel Badoff

Miguel Ángel Arkatyn

Adriana Bai

Juana María Armelín

Arturo Baibiene

Raúl Aroldi

César Augusto Baldini

Miguel Angel Arra

Angel Baldraco

Jorge Omar Arreche

Luis Alberto Baleano

Analía Alicia Arriola

Pablo Alberto Balut

Juan Carlos Arroyo

Guillermo Luis Ball Llatinas

Horacio Antonio Arrué

Adrián Ceferino Ballestero "Victor"

Rómulo Artieda

Esther Ballestrino de Careaga

María Asunción Artigas Nilo de Moyano

Daniel Agustín Baquero

Juan José María Ascone
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Luis Antonio Barassi

Andrés Humberto Bellizzi Bellizzi

Hector Baratti

Juan Pedro Belluz

Liliana Ester Barbieri

Daniel Albino Benavídez

Julio Elías Barcat

Daniel Eduardo Bendersky

Julio César Barozzi

Aníbal Carlos Benítez

Eduardo Barrera

Ramona Benítez de Amarilla

Juan Carlos Barrera

Vicente José Benítez

Raul Barreto Capelli

Rutilio Dardo Betancour Roth

Eduardo Froilan Barrios

Amado Berardo

Washington Javier Barrios Fernandez

Remo Carlos Berardo

María del Carmen Barros de Zaffora

Rubén Abel Beratz

Oscar Osvaldo Barros

Martín Elías Bercovich

Egidio Battistiol

Carlos José Guillermo Berdini

Raúl Augusto Bauducco

Graciela Alicia Beretta

Rubén Santiago Bauer Chimeno

María Magdalena Beretta Pose

Alberto Noé Bayarsky

Azucena Ricarda Bermejo de Rondoletto

Carlos Eduardo Becker

Alberto Bernal Tejada

Susana Beatriz Becker

José Pablo Bernard

Darío Oscar Bedne

María Cristina Bernat

María Bedoian de Ikonikoff

Juan José Berninsone

Guillermo José Begega

Horacio Félix Bertholet

Juan Francisco Belaustegui

Carlos Guillermo Berti Dominguez

Martín Belaustegui Herrera

Juan Ricardo Bertos

Rafael José Belaustegui Herrera

Cristina Bettanin de Colmenares

Valeria Belaustegui Herrera de Waisberg

Leonardo Bettanin

Fernando Alberto Belizán

Ramón Oscar Bianchi

Hugo Francisco Bellagamba

Eduardo José Bicocca

Mariana Belli

Salvador Juan Bidegorry
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Patricio Biedma Scadewaldt

Juan Raúl Bourg Pineau

Ricardo Miguel Biegkler Almendra

Eduardo Julio Bracaccini

María Cristina Bienposto

Robert Marcel Boudet

Claudio Daniel Bignasco

Susana Mercedes Boulocq Korn de
Concetti

Guillermo Daniel Binstock

Angel Enrique Brandazza

Carlos Hugo Blanco

Gabriel Braunstein

Viviana Avelina Blanco

Claudio Braverman

Luis Rodolfo Bledel

Jesús María Bravo

Hugo Alberto Boca

Omar Fernando Bravo

Nestor Boca

Alfredo Oscar Brawerman

Nilda Mabel Boca de Mansilla

Juan José Brero Tolosa

Listo Ramón Bogado

Hortensia Brito

Francisco Javier Bogarini

Victor Mario Brizzi

Victor Pablo Boichenko

Julia Angélica Brocca de Herrero

Adriana Silvia Boitano

Fernando Ruben Brodsky

Guillermo Carlos Boitano Brañas

Jose Daniel Bronzel

Miguel Angel Boitano

Roberto Oscar Brullo Cea

Liliana Beatriz Bojanich

Carlos Alberto Bruni

Daniel Bombara

Aida Leonora Bruschtein Bonaparte

Raúl Alfredo Bonafini

Irene Bruschtein Bonaparte

Ana Maria Bonatto

Victor Bruschtein Bonaparte

Jorge Alberto Bonil

Arnaldo Haroldo Buffa

Eduardo Bonin

María Luisa Buffo

Nelly Yolanda Borda

Roberto Horacio Bugatti Osvald

Raúl Edgardo Borelli Cattaneo

Eduardo Oscar Bulacio

Rodolfo Mario Borroni

Tomás Angel Bulacio

Carlos Borucio

Alicia Raquel Burdisso

Oscar Isidro Borzi

Jorge Alberto Burghard
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Julio Genaro Burgos Ponce

Alfredo José Cajide

Ada Margaret Burgueño

Italo Américo Cali

Osvaldo Enrique Busetto

Jorge Donato Calvo

Enrique Bustamante

Daniel Eduardo Calleja

Juan Carlos Bustamante

Norma Estela Campano

Aldo Meliton Bustos

Simón Campano

Cármen Santiago Bustos

Horacio Domingo Campiglia

Edelmiro Cruz Bustos

Horacio Raúl Campione

María Cristina Bustos de Coronel

Julio César Campopiano

Miguel Ángel Bustos

Antonia Adriana Campos de Alcaraz

Miguel Angel Butrón

María Silvia Campos

José Caamaño Uzal

Jorge Candeloro

Eduardo Luis Caballero

José María Cane

Wenceslao Eduardo Caballero

Arturo Canedo del Oso

Damián Cabandié

Luis Canfaila

Nelson Martín Cabello Pérez

Ernesto Enrique Canga

Gustavo Alejandro Cabezas

José Antonio Cano

Dardo Cabo

Alberto Canovas Estape

Oscar Ramón Cabral

Edison Oscar Cantero Freire

Ary Cabrera Prates

Ana Beatriz Cantos de Caldera

Hugo Cacciavillani Caligari

Luis Antonio Cantos

Jorge Eliseo Cáceres

Jorge Antonio Capello

Edgar Claudio Cadima Torrez

Carlos Hugo Capitman

Eduardo Alberto Cagnola

Julio Cesar Carboni

Ricardo Luis Cagnoni

Alvaro Cardenas

Claudio Caielli

Daniel Hugo Carignano

Rafael Caielli

Eduardo Carlas Salas

Liliana Beatriz Caimi de Marizcurrena

Oscar Marcos Carloni
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Adrián Orlando Carlovich

Haydée María Castelltort

Laura Estela Carlotto

Miguel Ángel Castiglioni Cornes

Carlos Alberto Carpani

Ana María Castillo

Pablo Carpintero Lobo

Liliana Graciela Castillo Barrios de
Ovejero

Ricardo Carpintero Lobo

Norberto José Castillo

Adriana María Carranza

Oscar Silverio Castillo

Carlos Alberto Carranza

Ramón Roque Castillo

Cecilia María Carranza

José María Castiñeiras

Gonzalo Abel Carranza

Alfredo Jorge Castro Montero

Cristina Carreño Araya

Héctor Castro

Roberto Eugenio Carri

Hugo Alberto Castro

Manuel Daniel Carricondo

Luis Marcelo Castro Montero

Maria Inés Carrieri de Velásquez

María Antonia Castro Huerga de
Martínez

Norma Lidia Carrizo
Carlos Roberto Carrozzino

Jorge Antonio Catanese

Ana María Caruso de Carri

Gladys Hebe Caudet

Gaspar Onofre Casado

Hector Cavallo

María Segunda Casado

Elisa E. Cayul de Cugura

María Adriana Casajus de Gonzales
Villar

Jorge Omar Cazenave
Jorge Omar Cazorla

Edith María Casares

Santiago Alberto Cazón

Juan Carlos Casariego de Bel

Laura Cedola de Monteagudo

Honorio Orlando Casas

Edigo Jesús Cejas Arias

Marta Beatriz Cascella

Jorge Nestor Cena

Yolanda Iris Casco Ghelpi de D'Elia

María Cenador de Rondoletto

Claudio Argentino Casoy

Norberto Centeno

Héctor Daniel Cassataro

Francisco Tenório Cerqueira Júnior

Anibal Ramón Castagno Luzardo

Alicia Dora Cerrota de Ramos

Roberto Castelli
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Liliana Teresa Certo

Diana Noemí Conde

Miguel Cervantes

Haroldo Pedro Conti

Luis Justo Augusto Cervera Novo

Roberto Julio Coria

Eduardo Cespedes

Juan Bautista Coronel

Roberto Eduardo Cevasco

Ana Cristina Corral Romano

Luis Alberto Ciancio

Carlos Esteban Correa Bravo

David Nolver Cilleruelo

María Mercedes Correa

Carlos Cinqualbre

Mariel Corsi

Luis German Cirigliano

Miguel Arcángel Cortez

Ignacio Manuel Cisneros

Carlos Gustavo Cortiñas

Ricardo Alberto Cittadini

Gabriel Fernando Costilla

Roxana Teresa Claros Romero

Margarita Del Carmen Costilla de
Villagra

Jean Ives Claudet Fernandez

María Cristina Cournour

Ines Adriana Cobo

Mirtha Noelia Coutoune

Luis Alberto Coconier

Carlos Alberto Coy

Manuel Enrique Cohn

Ricardo Alfredo Cravello

Oscar Hugo Coker

Laura Noemí Creatore

Juana Matilde Colayago de Battistiol

Laura Lía Crespo de Moya

Eduardo Alberto Colella

Rodolfo Alberto Crespo

Jaime José Colmenares

Roberto Luis Cristina

Liliana Teresa Colombetti De Bulac

Celso Pedro Cruces

Gerardo Coltzau Fernández

Alicia Edith Cruz de Rebagliati

Susana Aurora Collinet

Mercedes Leonor Cuadrelli de Arin
Delacourt

Atlántida Coma Velasco de Ardito
Luis Commatteo

María Georgina Cubas de Pérez

Gastón Roberto Concalvez

Enrique Cuella

Abel Rodolfo Concetti

Aberlardo H. Cuesta

Hugo Milciades Concha López

Hugo Ramón Cuesta
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Jorge Anselmo Cueto

Luis Tomás D'Arcángelo

José Esteban Cugura

Gerónimo Américo Da Costa

Juan Oscar Cugura

María Cristina Da Re

Lucia Cullen

Héctor Jorge Dadin Vesare

Gloria Constanza Curia

Ricardo Dakuyaku

María Liliana Curra

Yolanda Mabel Damora

Domingo Hidelgardo Chacón

Alberto Dapozo

José Rafael Chamas

Daniel Alberto Daroqui

Francisco José Changazzo

Jorge Arturo Daroqui

José Adhemar Changazzo

Juan Carlos Daroqui

Oscar Rodolfo Changazzo Riquiflor

Francoise Marie Dauthier

Juan Carlos Chaparro

Carlos Alberto Davit Testa

Ana María Chapeta Lario

Claudio de AchaRubén Mario De
Angelis

Gustavo Adolfo Chavarino

Alicia Estela De Cicco

Hector Gerardo Chaves

Eugenio Osvaldo de Cristófaro
Castrillón

José Guetas Chebala
Juan Carlos Chersanaz

Luis Eduardo De Cristofaro

Jacobo Chester

Jorge Luis de Iriarte

Carlos Alberto Chiappolini

Elena de la Cuadra

Ricardo Chidichimo

Roberto José de la Cuadra

Miguel Ricardo Chiernajowsky

Carlos Enrique De La Fuente

Jorge Luis Chinetti

Carlos Alberto De Lorenzo

Eduardo Chizzola

Eduardo Antonio de Pedro Maldonado

Julián Choque Cahuana

Pablo Carmelo De Pino

Alicia Silvia Chuburu

Silvia de Raffaelli de Peralta

Alicia Raquel D'ambra

Victor de Raffaelli

Carlos Alberto D'ambra

Cristóbal Augusto Dedionigi

Julio Cesar D'Elia Pallares

Raul Arturo Deget
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Eduardo José Degregori

Ricardo Mario Díaz

María del Cármen del Bosco de Allende

Santiago Augusto Díaz

Julio Arnaldo Del Castillo

Cristina Diez de Celesia

Eduardo José Del Fabro

Diana Carmen Diez de Rentani

Juan Domingo Del Gesso

Jorge Manuel Diez Díaz

Norma Beatriz del Missier

Patricia Dillon de Ciancio

Néstor José del Río

Luis Vicente Dimattia

Carmen Angélica Delard Cabezas

Ricardo Dios

Eduardo Alberto Delfino

Mirta Noemí Dithurbide

Juan Ramón Delgado Vial

Patricia Liliana Dixon

Nora Mabel Delgado

Valeria Dixon de Garat

Carlos María Denis

Raul Aurelio Dobelli

Hernando Deria

Graciela María Doldan

Graciela Josefa Devallis de Paulín

Yves Marie Alain Domergue

Nestor Devincenti

Eleonora Dominguez de Cristina

Oscar Alfredo Dezorzi

Miguel Alejandro Domínguez

Miguel Angel Di Pascua

Porfirio Domínguez

Jorge Fernando Di Pascuale

Ricardo Eulogio Dominguez Ferreyra

Antonio Adolfo Díaz López

María Ester Donza de Coria

Enrique Gonzalo Díaz Macias

Stella Maris Dorado

Fernando Díaz Cárdenas

Pablo Hermes Dorigo

Francisco Rafael Díaz

P. Carlos Dorñak

Guillermo Eduardo Díaz Nieto

Edmundo Sabino Dossetti Techeira

José Raul Díaz Fernández

Benjamín Isaac Dricas

Luis Miguel Díaz Salazar

Georgina Graciela Droz Estrada

Manuel Julio Díaz

José Alfredo Duarte

Maria Beatriz Diaz

Eduardo Agustín Duclos

Mario Alberto Díaz Moscardo

Aníbal Durand Martinez
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Rubén Sabino Dure

Mario René Espinoza Barahona

Rodolfo Mario Eder

Carlos María Espoturno

Marcelo Adolfo Eggers

Alejandro Luis Estigarria

Víctor Felipe Egloff

Manuel Hugo Evequoz Fraga

Cecilia Eguia Benavídez

Luis Alberto Fabbri

Alicia Eguren de Cooke

Luis Mario Fachino

Martha Graciela Eiroa Martiniano

Pablo Antonio Faimberg

Luis Enrique Eisenschlas

Susana Falabella de Abdala

Américo Eiza

Dora Liliana Falco

Luis Enrique Elgueta

Carlos Agustín Falcon

Nilda Elías de Silva

María Claudia Falcone

Rodolfo Daniel Elías

Roberto Nando Falivene

Claudio Epelbaum

José Fernando Fanjul

Lila Epelbaum

Pedro Faramiñán Medina

Luis Epelbaum

Patricia Faraoni

Guillermo Angel Ercolano

Daniel Felipe Farias

Marianne Erize Tisseau

Omar Rodolfo Farias

Margarita Erlich Jaroszewich

Beatriz Fariñas de Fornies

Marta Esain

Carlos Guillermo Fassano

Eduardo Gonzalo Escabosa

Daniel Omar Favero

Francisco Alfredo Escamez

Laura Isabel Feldman

Felix Escobar

Ester Felipe

Sergio Alberto Escot

Anahí Silvia Fernández de Mercader

Hernán Gregorio Escudero

Antonia Fernández de Tellez

Néstor Julio España

Carlos Alfredo Fernández Bastarrica

Enrique Espeche

Cecilia Fernández Riquelme

Eduardo T. Espinosa Lever

Clara Haydee Fernández

José Guillermo Espinoza Pesantes

Eliseo Reynaldo Fernandez
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Ernesto Fernández Vidal

Carlos Alberto Fiorito

Godoberto Luis Fernández

Jorge Oscar Firmenich

Hector Hugo Fernández Baños

Claudia Julia Fita Miller

Hilda Adriana Fernandez

Jorge Abelardo Flaccavento

Jesús Carlos Alberto Fernández

Walter Kenneth Fleury

José Nicasio Fernández Alvarez

Antonio Flores

José Osvaldo Germán Fernández

Antonio Jorge Flores

Mabel Fernández de Hirschler

Carlos Jacinto Flores

María Cristina Fernández de Pankonin

Horacio Bernardo Flores

Oscar Alfredo Fernández

José Francisco Flores

Rita Manuela Fernández

Mario Ivar Flores

Claudio Arnaldo Ferraris

Nelson Flores Ugarte

Elena Alicia Ferreiro

Pedro Ventura Flores

José Miguel Ferrero

Patricia Teresa Flynn

Diego Ferreyra Beltrán

Gustavo Adolfo Fochi

María Irma Ferreira

Graciela Noemí Folini de Villeres

Edith Alicia Ferri

Adrián Omar Follonier

Juan José Ficarra

Juan Carlos Follonier

Alcira Gabriela Fidalgo Pizarro de
Valenzuela

Mabel Lucía Fontana de La Blunda
Adolfo Nelson Fontanella

Gloria Susana Figueroa

Romero Faustino Fontenlla

Miguel Ángel Figueroa

Alejandro Luis Formica

Ernesto Mario Filgueira Strien

Hugo Enrique Fornies

Marta de las Mercedes Filgueira Strien

Daniel Hugo Fortunato

Nélida Estela Filgueira Strien

Jorge Horacio Foulkes

Enrique Carlos Fimiani

Humberto Luis Fraccarolli

Claudio Marcelo Fink

Osvaldo Enrique Fraga

Orlando Finsterwald

Gustavo Ernesto Fraire

Armando Alberto Fioritti
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Carlos Hugo Franano

Mario Guillermo Galli

Adriana María Franconetti de Calvo

Stella Maris Gallicchio de Vicario

Ana María Franconetti

Miguel Angel Gallinari

Eduardo Alvaro Franconetti

Carlos Alberto Gambande Ruperti

Amalia Rosa Franchelli de Dobelli

Delia Elena Garaguso

Generosa Fratassi

Eduardo Héctor Garat

Verónica Freier

Esteban Francisco Garat

Héctor Manuel Freijo

Alejandro Horacio García Martegani

Tomás Fresneda

Antonio Domingo García

Florencio Ramón Frias

Diana Iris García

Pedro Arturo Frías

Ernesto García

Carlos Mario Frigerio

Germán Nelson García Carcagno

Luis M. Frutos

Hilda Magdalena García

Aída Fuciños Rielo de Galizzi

Horacio Oscar García Castelu

Luis Alberto Fuentes

Iris Nélida García

Julio César Fumarola

Ileana García Ramos

Aníbal Eduardo Gadea

María Claudia García Irureta Goyena de
Gelman

Emilia Susana Gaggero Pérez de Pujals

Nestor Enrique García

Juan Carlos Gagliano

Pablo Alberto García

Ana María Gago Benedetti

Ricardo Bermundo García

Patricia Mabel Gaitán

Salvador García Robles

Crescencio Galañena Hernández

Victor Hugo García Tosoratto

Julio Isabelino Galarza

Nèlida Leonor Garde de Repetto

Blanca Eva Galizzi Marzzan

Luis Lorenzo Garello

Juan Alberto Galizzi Machi

Adelina Noemí Gargiulo de Zibaico

Juan Carlos Galván

Héctor Hugo Gargiulo

Cristina Galzerano

Arturo Martín Garín

Liliana Elida Galletti

María Adelia Garín De De Angelis
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Ángel Mario Garmendia

Catalina Ginder

Edgardo Roberto Garnier

Héctor Orlando Giordano Cortazzo

José Luis Aníbal Garoni

Alfredo Antonio Giorgi

Adriana Gatti Casal

Horacio Gerardo Girardello Amabilia

Gerardo Gatti Antuna

Mario Giribaldi

Eduardo Alberto Garutti

Osvaldo Giribaldi

Teresa Garzón de Rodríguez

Rómulo Carlos Giuffra

Carlos Oscar Gatto

Raymundo Gleyzer

Padre Pablo Gazzarri

Eugenio Pablo Glovatzky Klimczuk

Marcelo Ariel Gelman

Carmen Nelly Godoy de Reczk

Julio Cesar Genoud

Mario Alberto Godoy

Claudio Martín Gerbilsky

Marcela Cristina Goeytes

Mirta Teresa Gerelli

Julio Goitia

Luis Román Gerez

Franklin Lucio Goizueta Piccioni

Eduardo Raúl Germano

Mónica Liliana Goldberg

Esther Gersberg de Díaz Salazar

Liliana Ines Goldenberg

Ángel Salomón Gertel

Hugo Alberto Goldsman

Fernando Mario Gertel

Hugo Ernesto Gomensoro Josman

Juan Carlos Gesualdo

Carmen Gómez de Gargiulo

Ricardo Mario Ghigliazza

Daniel Osvaldo Gómez Almeida

Elsa Gider de Krayem

Eva del Jesús Gómez de Agüero

Carlos Alberto Giglio

Gladys Lucía Gómez

Miguel Máximo Gil

Ileana Esther Gómez Ríos

Douglas Gillie

María Elena Gómez de Argañaraz

Nerio Deryck Gillie

Ricardo Isidro Gómez

Helios Gimenez Amuedo

Gaston Roberto Goncalves

Silvia Noemí Giménez de Guido

Jorge Feliberto Gonçalves Busconi

Tránsito Giménez

Alfredo Gonzalez
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Américo González Villar

Carlos Fernando Gregori

Ana María González Granada

Néstor Rubén Grill

Carlos Alberto González

Monica Grinspon de Logares

Horacio Mario Gonzalez

Daniel José Gropper

Jesús Angel González

Susana Flora Grynberg

Jesús Manuel González

Lía Mariana Guangiroli de Genoud

Lidia Edith González Eusebi

Enrique Gerardo Guastavino

Manuel Angel Gonzalez

Carlos Alberto Gudano

Olga Cristina González

Dante Guede

Pedro Antonio Gonzalez

Héctor Ricardo Guede

Regino Adolfo González Sandaña

Eduardo Guerci

Silvia Amanda Gonzalez de Mora

Alicia Margarita Guerrero

Socorro Irene Gonzalez

Carlos Francisco Guidet Sánchez

Susana Gonzalez de Weisz

Raul Alfredo Guido

Susana Raquel González

Florencia Guillén

Víctor Hugo González Lemos

Salvador Jorge Gullo

Silvia Beatriz Goñi de Rossi

Jorge Luis Gurrea

Jorge Israel Gorfinkiel

Manuel Gutiérrez

Daniel Gorosito

Norberto A. Habbeger

Alberto Jorge Gorrini

Dagmar Hagelin

Francisco Eduardo Gotschlich Cordero

Fernando Hallgarten

María Esther Goulecdzian

Celia Ester Hanono

Hugo Alberto Goyenetche

Alejandro Alfredo Hansen

Adela Noemí Goyochea

Luisa Ana Heck De Barciocco

José Luis GoyocheaMiguel Ángel
Gradaschi Camano

Hernán Jorge Henríquez
Juan Marcos Herman

Sara Grande

Eduardo Alberto Hernández

Claudio Nicolás Grandi

José Hernández

Javier Gustavo Grebel Libobich
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Juan H. Hernandez Zaspe

Saturnino Vicente Ianni

Reinaldo Ariel Hernández

Luis Armando Ibañez

Abel Herrera

Luisa Ana Ibañez

Claudio Daniel Herrera

Nancy Norma Ibáñez

Leonor Ines Herrera

Roberto Aníbal Ibánez

Juan Domingo Herrera

Miguel Ibarbe

Máximo Fernando Herrera

Justo César Ibarguren

Miguel Gerónimo Herrera

Emilio Antonio Ibarra

Nestor Ubaldo Herrera

Raúl Alberto Iglesias

Roberto Justo Herrera

Bernardo Ignace

Rosa Dalia Herrera

Ignacio Ikonikoff

Jose Luis Herrero

Armando Imas

Jairo de Jesús Herrón Fernández

Daniel Alfredo Inama

Amelia Higa

Adolfo Luis Infante Allende

Juan Carlos Higa

Jorge Rosalino Infantino

Andrés Ernesto Hirschler

Liliana Iorio

Carlos Alberto Hobert

Silvia Mabel Isabella Valenzi

Oscar Luis Hodola

José Luis Isla

Oscar Omar Hofer

Ismael Alfredo Islas Ibarra

Victor Hugo Hofer

Martín Alfredo Islas

Alberto Hojman Trainoff

Teresa Israel

Miguel Angel Horton

Claudia Istueta

Julia Natividad Huarque

Alexis Jaccard Siegler

Francisco Host Venturi

Ricardo Ramón Jacobe

Susana Noemi Huarte Martinez

María Carolina Jacue

Patricia Huchansky de Simó

Susana Rosa Jacué

Norma Susana Huder de Prado

Angel Gustavo Jaeggi Díaz

Oscar Lautaro Hueravilo

Noemi Jansenson
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Luis Adolfo Jaramillo

Carlos Cayetano La Rosa

María del Carmen Jaramillo

Nora Susana La Spina

Máximo Eduardo Jaroslavsky

Carlos Alberto Labolita

Rolando Hugo Jeckel

Miguel Angel Labrador Pérez

Maurice Jeger

Gustavo Horacio Lafleur

Alejandro E. Jerez Bordeau

Monica Silvia Lafuente

Victor Jerez

Teresita Leoni Lagger De Marenda

Ramona Berta Jimenez

Alberto Carlos Lago

Juan Carlos Jordán Vercellone

Fernando Juan Lagos

Esteban Bonifacio Juarez

Oscar Alejandro Lagrotta

Máximo José Juárez

Leonor Rosario Landaburu de Catnich

Telba Juárez

Mabel Landi

Sergio León Kacs

Martín Ramón Landin

Elena Kalaidjian

Ana Maria Lanzillotto de Menna

Julio Kalejman

Maria Cristina Lanzillotto de Santillan

Cecilio Kamenetzky

Guillermo Antonio Lara

Elisabeth Kasemann

Electra Irene Lareu Vieira de
Belaustegui

Marlene Katherine Kegler Krug

Juan José Laso

Gloria Kehoe Wilson

Omar Enrique Lauria

Jorge Oscar Kofman Zeigner

Enzo Lauroni

Carlos Antonio Koks

Hugo Anibal Lavalle

Alfredo Arturo Kölliker Frers

Patricia Emilia Lazzeri

Eduardo Sergio Korsunsky

Beatriz Le Fur

José Kreplak

Heriberto del Carmen Leal Sanhueza

Irene Krichmar de Butrón

Nestor José Ledesma Yocca

Jorge Arturo Kuhn

Alberto Agapito Ledo

Pedro La Blunda

José Luis Leduc

Jorge José La Cioppa

Hilda Leikis de Alvarez
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Eduardo Raúl Leguizamón

Carlos López

Miguel Angel Leguizamon

Eduardo Néstor López

Carlos Alberto Leinbock

Felix Daniel López Saracco

Adán Rodolfo Leiva

Héctor Enrique López

María Delia Leiva

Héctor María López Matheu

Augusto María Lenzi

José Manuel Lopez

Susana Leonardi de Nievas

Leopoldo Omar López

Roberto Omar Leonardo

María Cristina López Guerra de
Belaustegui

Lucio Leone

Mirta Graciela Lopez

Pablo Armando Lepiscopo

Mirtha Gladys López

Ana María Lescano

Néstor López Fornes

Arturo Alberto Lescano

Ramón Francisco López

Luis Alejandro Lescano

Ricardo Ernesto López

María Amelia Lesgart

Roberto Raúl López

Rogelio Anibal Lesgart

Rosa Ceferina López

Jorge Claudio Lewi

Urbano López Fernández

Néstor Abel Leyes

Carlos Alberto Lorenzo

Julio Roberto Liano

Clara Josefina Lorenzo Tillard

Susana Libedinsky

María Esther Lorusso Lammle

Manuel Liberoff

Alberto Isidro Losada

Daniel Eduardo Linares Luque

Juan Carlos Losoviz

Oscar Andrés Liñeira

Daniel Roberto Loto Zurita

Patricio Guillermo Lobo

José Teodoro Loto Zurita

Claudio Logares

Roberto Mario Loyola

Ricardo Lois

Carlos Alberto Lucantis

María Cristina Lonardi de Cravello

Rodolfo Guillermo Luccioni

Adrián Sergio López

Federico Gerardo Ludden Lehmann

Celia López Alonso

Cesar Lugones
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Juan Manuel Luna
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Olga Luteral

Juan Santiago Mangini

Raúl Alfredo Llanes

Alejandro Pedro Mansilla

Ramón Antonio Llanivelli Rojas

Liliana Mansilla

Carlos Llerena Rosas

Ricardo Hugo Manuele

Sebastián María Llorens

Daniel Aldo Manzotti

Noemí Beatriz Macedo

Adriana Claudia Marandet Bobes de
Ruival

Celia Sara Machado de Rébori

Carlos Ruben Marcón

Esteban Abundio Machado

Américo Jorge Marchetti

Modesto Humberto Machado

Angel Dante Marchi Bena

Luis Norberto Macor

Elizabeth Patricia Marcuzzo

Graciela Macrenzic

Nora Beatriz Mardikiand de Cabello

Jorge Angel Machuca Muñoz

Juan Carlos Mardikiand

Armando Madariaga Antolin

Félix Oscar Marelli

Patricia Rossana Maddalena de Romero

Cecilia Marfortt de Trod

Juan Pablo Maestre

Arturo José Margaride Goyos

Walter Ramón Magallanes

Hector Marghetich

Carlos Horacio Magariños

Adolfo Margutti

Horacio Domingo Maggio

Daniel Enrique Mariani

Miguel Ángel Magnarelli

Francisco Eduardo Marín

María Cecilia Magnet Ferrero de
Tamburini

Juan Carlos Marín

Roberto Maimone

Juan Marinaro

Dominga Antonia Maisano de Loyola

Eduardo Aníbal Marino

Jorge Eduardo Malberti Risso

Enrique Julio Marino

Hugo Armando MalozowskiAlicia
Mallea

Andrés Marizcurrena
Juan Patricio Maroni
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María Beatriz Maroni

Bibiana Martini de Adur

Arturo Gustavo Marotta

Juan Francisco Martinis

Liliana Alicia Marchetti de Araujo

Pedro Oscar Martucci

Irma Beatriz Márquez

Heraldo Juan Marucco

Luis Ernesto Marquez

Leonor Gertrudis Marx Pinkus

Cristina Lucía Marrocco

Monica Masri

Susana Marrocco

Alejandro Daniel Masriera

Julio Antonio Martin

Ricardo Alberto Massa

Melita Ruth Martín Carrasco

Hugo Massucco

Laura Susana Martinelli de Oliva

Martino Mastinu

Adriana Martinez Perez

Marta Zelmira Mastrogiácomo

Alfredo Guillermo Martínez

Alejandro Ángel Mastrogiovanni

Ana María Martínez

Abel Héctor Mateu Gallardo

Atilio Cesar Martínez Lagrava

Raúl Humberto Mattarollo Olmos

César Carlos Martínez

Roberto Jorge Matthews

Eduardo Alberto Martínez

María Cristina Mattioli de Torterau

Elsa Martínez de Ramírez

Orlando Maturano

Héctor Luis Martínez

Nora Luisa Maurer

Horacio Martinez

María Angélica Mayor de Rosales

Jorge Alberto Martínez Abelleida

Vicente Jorge Mazzitelli

José Agustín Martínez Agüero

Winston César Mazzuchi Frantches

José Alberto Martínez

César Alfredo Mecking

José Mario Martínez Suárez

María Graciela Médici

María Luisa Martínez de González

Angel Alfonso Medina Gutiérrez

Rocío Ángela Martínez

Gustavo Medina Ortiz

Segundo Luis Martínez

Oscar Alberto Medina

Susana M. Martinez Wasserman

Roberto Luis Medina

Ubaldo Nieves Martínez

Susana B. Medina de Bertholet
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Hugo Alberto Megna

Asunción del Carmen Meza

Delfor Manuel Meira

Sabino Meza

Norma Hilda Melani

Alberto Daniel Miani

Nebio Ariel Melo Cuesta

Daniel Bernardo Micucci

Graciela Mellibovsky Saidler

Viviana Micucci

Helvio Alcides Mellino

Mónica María Candelaria Mignone

Antonio Mendez

Guillermo Augusto Miguel

Jorge Omar Méndez Trejo

Silvia Emilia Miguens

José Delineo Mendez

Nilda Miguez de Molina

Orlando Reneé Mendez

Pablo Antonio Miguez

Pedro Alberto Mendez

Rosa Leonor Millan de Sosa

Carlos María MendozaJorge Mendoza
Calderón

Cecilia Laura Minervini
Francisco Natalio Mirabelli

Mario Eduardo Menéndez

Haydee Lucía Miralles

Domingo Menna

Luis Ernesto Miramon

Eduardo Ezequiel Merajver Bercovich

Oscar Miranda

Mario Miguel Mercader

Raúl Miranda

Adela Del Carmen Mercado

Susana Elvira Miranda

Gladys del Valle Mercado Paez

Mirta Misetich

María del Valle Mercado

Amalia Clotilde Moavro

Manuel Antonio Mercado

Adolfo Rubén Moldavsky

María Leonor Mercuri Monzó

Marcela Esther Molfino

Rodolfo Antonio Merediz

Dardo Francisco Molina

Dante Aníbal Merolla

Domingo Calisto Molina Moya

Fernando Salvador Merolla

Jesús Juan Carlos Molina

Alicia Norma Meroño

Jorge Carlos Molina

Diego Eugenio Merzbacher Schorr

Jorge Luis Molina

Rubén "Tito" Messiez

José María Molina

Raúl Eugenio Metz
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Raúl Mateo Molina

Jorge Horacio Moreno

Guillermo Mario Molinillo

Nélida Noemi Moreno de Goyochea

Liliana Edith Molteni

Pedro Francisco Moresi

Luis Carlos Mónaco

Ester Moretti

José Manuel Monteagudo

Roberto Morillo

Mariano Carlos Montequín

Luis Rodolfo Morina Jung

Roald Montes

Miguel Angel Morini

Stella Maris Montesano de Ogando

Norberto Julio Morresi

Leonardo Amador Montesinos

Raúl Oscar Mortola

María Virginia Monzani de Andisco

Jorge Teodoro Mosqueda

Edy Luis Santiago Monzon Novena

Antonio Juan Mosquera

José Reinaldo Monzón

Rubén Hugo Motta

Juan Carlos Mora

Toni Agatina Motta

Alejandro Manuel Morales

Jorge Horacio Moura

José Ramon Morales

Eusebio Jesús Mouriño González

José Silvano Morales

Miguel Ángel Moussegne

Julio César Morales

Ricardo Alfredo Moya

Luis Alberto Morales

Alfredo Moyano Santander

Mercedes del Valle Morales

Eduardo Horacio Moyano

Mónica Morán

Ana María Mrad de Medina

Ariel Eduardo Morandi

María Josefina Mujica

Héctor Victorio Morandi

Alberto José Munarriz

Susana Carmen Moras

Luis Munitis Orione

María Rosa Moreira de Fernández

Agustina Muñiz Paz

Fidela Morel

Diego Muñiz Barreto

Pedro Crisólogo Morel

María Dolores Muniz Etchemoun

Carlos Alberto Moreno

Santa Muratore de Lepere

Graciela Moreno

Eduardo Jorge Murillo Jeansen
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Rosa Angélica Murno

Juan Angel Nughes

Gladys Noemí Musante

Felix Edgardo Núñez

Julio Argentino Mussi

Roque Miguel Nuñez

Pablo Daniel Musso

Roque Nuñez

Gregorio Nachman

Victor Hugo Nuñez

Pedro Luis Nadal García

Rosa Adela Oberti De Soriano

Carmen Liliana Nahs de Bruzzone

Sauro Antonio Obreque

Jorge Miguel Name

Claudio Melquiades Ocampo Alonso

Claudio Norberto Nardini

Carlos Abel Ocerin Fernández

Dina Nardone

Beatriz Marta Oesterheld

Cristina Navajas de Santucho

Diana Irene Oesterheld

Eduardo Navajas Jauregui

Estela Inés Oesterheld

María Victoria Navajas Jáuregui

Héctor Germán Oesterheld

Julio Alfredo Navarro

Marina Oesterheld

Alicia Irene Naymark Gabe

Emilio Horacio Ogando

Paulo Alberto Nazaro

Gustavo Ogando Gibello

Raquel Negro

Jorge Oscar Ogando

Beatriz Haydee Neuhaus de Martinis

Carlos Alberto Oliva

Adriana Silvia Nieto

Carlos Delfin Oliva

Juan Mateo Nieto

Leticia M. Oliva de Méndez

Marcos Eugenio Nieva

Rafael Olivera

Oscar Rene Nieva

Raúl Pedro Olivera Cancela

Mario Alberto Nivoli

Roberto Héctor Olivestre

Alberto Teodoro Noailles

Gloria Martha Olivieri Ramos

Graciela Mirta Nogueira de Ricny

Gustavo Gabriel Olmedo

María de Lourdes Noia de Mezzadra

José Horacio Olmedo

Fernando Pablo Nolasco

Gary Nelson Olmos Guzmán

Rosa Eugenia Novillo Corvalan

Chris Anna Olson Latta
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Inés Ollero

Alberto Paira (M)

Juan Carlos Ontivero

José Serapio Palacio

Eduardo O'Neill

Rubén Amadeo Palazzesi

Alicia Nora Oppenheimer

Norberto Hugo Palermo

Miguel Iván Orellana Castro

Hugo Alberto Palmeiro

Alberto Marcelo Oro

Mario Oscar Paluci

Daniel Franciso Orozco

Osvaldo C. Paludi

Rodolfo Ortega Peña

Antonio Pandolfino

Blanca Esther Ortiz de Murua

Julio Enzo Panebianco Labbe

Ramón Antonio Ortiz

Enrique Pankonin Abis

Rodolfo Ortiz Escobar

Jorge Edgardo Papadopulos

Jorge Eduardo Oshiro

Jorge Emilio Papetti

Oscar Oshiro

Luján Susana Papic

Pablo Osorio

Juan Carlos Parada

Susana Elena Ossola de Urrua

Adolfo Paredes

David Manuel Ostrowiecki

José Alfredo Pareja Galviati

Lidia Neptalis Otarola

Hugo Alberto Parente

María Cristina Otarola

Alberto José Pargament

Alfredo Outon

Silvina Mónica Parodi de Orozco

Héctor Rafael Ovejero

Patricia Elida Parreira

Victor Humberto Ovejero

Silvana Parrile de Salinas

Eduardo Oviedo Morales

Otilio Julio Pascua

Raúl Enrique Oxley

Gustavo Pasik

Mario Daniel Oyarzabal

Aida Alicia Pastarini

Roberto Simón Ozorio

Alberto Manuel Pastor

Coca Pablo

Héctor Mario Patino

Víctor Hugo Paciaroni

Costanza Paz

Vicente Padín Pillado

Raúl Santiago Paz
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Enrique Carlos Pecoraro

Benjamín Pérez

Luis Hugo Pechien Navarro

Carlos Alberto Pérez

Josefina Teresa Pedemonte de Ruiz
Vargas

Carlos Alberto Pérez
Eugenio Carlos Pérez

Horacio Vital Pedraza

Félix Jorge Pérez

Susana Elena Pedrini

Jorge Eduardo Pérez Brancatto

Eugenio Roberto Pedrozo

Jorge Enrique Pérez Catán

Juan Pegoraro

Juan Carlos Pérez

Susana Beatriz Pegoraro

Julio Enrique Pérez Andrade

Justo José Pelozo

Marcos Antonio Pérez

Juan Carlos Pellegrini Druetto

Ricardo Adrián Pérez

Luis Roberto Pender

Walter Teófilo Pérez Loza

Hugo Reinaldo Penino

Graciela Pernas

Isidoro Peña

Jorge Luis Perón

Jesus Peña

Guillermo Perot

Juan Roger Peña Saenz

Rafael Andrés Perrota

Eustaquio Peralta

Susana Pertierra

Luis Alfredo Peralta

José Carlos Perucca Piacenzi

María Ester Peralta de Zalazar

María Elena Peter de Fioritti

Oscar Alcides Peralta

Nilda Graciela Peters

Silvia Peralta de Ferreyra

Angel Julio Petraglia

Berta Perassi

Roberto Francisco Piasecki

María del Carmen Percivati Franco

Félix Eduardo Picardi

Ana María Rita Perdighe

Aurora Valentina Pico de Garbarino

María Luisa Peredo

María Luisa Piedra Gómez

Stella Maris Pereiro de Gonzalez

Ana María Piffaretti

Liliana Carmen Pereyra

Alejandro Víctor Pina

Alicia Isabel Pérez de Astorga

Miguel Angel Pincheira

Ana María del Carmen Pérez
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Ángel Mario Pinedo

Segundo Oscar Porven

Lucia Elena Pinto

Adriana Silvia Prack

José Oscar Pintos

Angel Alberto Prado

Mónica Susana Pinus de Binstok

Sergio Guillermo Prado

Cora María Pioli

José Carlos Prat

Jorge Luis Piotti

Raúl Horacio Premat

Elba Beatriz Pirola de Rivelli

Armando Prieto Alonso

Julio Luis Piriz

Salvatore Privitera

Liliana Pizá de Paira

Alberto Armando Pruneda

Cristina Isabel Planas

Nicolás Puca

Osvaldo Plaul

Jorge Alberto Pucci Souza

Juan Domingo Plaza

Norma Lidia Puerto de Risso

Julio Poce

Juan Daniel Puigjané

Ricardo Poce

Luis Enrique Pujals

Celicia Podolsky de Bronzel

Jorge Gabriel Pujol

Horacio Norberto Poggio

Graciela Pujol de Olmedo

Miguel Alfredo Poinsteau Neuman

Alicia Mabel Queiro

Héctor Osvaldo Polito

Washington D Queiro Uzal

Victor José Polti

Graciela Irene Quesada

Alberto Santos Ponce

Carlos Quieto

Ana Maria Ponce

Roberto Quieto

Francisco Gregorio Ponce

María Ester Quignard

Griselda del Huerto Ponce

Silvia Mónica Quintela

Mercedes Gerardo Ponce

Jorge Alberto Quinterno Sabatini

Sara Isabel Ponti

Jorge Alberto Quinteros

Gladys del Valle Porcel de Puggioni

Pedro Ernesto Quiñones

Ada Victoria Porta

Julio César Quiroga

Miguel Ángel Porta

María Josefina Quiroga de Murúa
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Enrique Raab

Beatriz Recchia

Orlando Luis Raffo

Juan Enrique Reggiardo

Miguel Ragone

Yolanda Dolores Reguera Brites

Rodolfo Armando M. Ragucci

Esteban Alfredo Reimer

Jorge Daniel Raies

Eduardo Lucio Renedo

Jaime Abraham Ramallo Chavez

Alejandra Magdalena Renou

Adolfo Agustín Ramírez

Luis Alberto Rentani

Alicia Beatriz Ramirez Abella de
Cassataro

Lidia Elena Renzi
Hebe Nelly Repetto

Bárbara Ramírez Plante

Maria del Carmen Repetto

Elba Leonor Ramírez Abella de
Baibiene

Nestor Omar Repetto
Raúl Repetto

Héctor Eduardo Ramírez

Eduardo Requena

Hernán Ramírez

Liliana Beatriz Retegui

Oscar Aníbal Ramírez

Mario Horacio Revoledo

Rosario Victoria Ramírez de Vega

Lucila Adela Révora

Eduardo Ramos Mejía

Eduardo Raimundo Rey

José Eduardo Ramos

Manuel Zoilo Reyes

Juan Carlos Ramos López

Hugo Javier Rezeck

Noemí Concepción Ramos

Ariel Ricetti

Susana Beatríz Ramos de Bidegorry

Guillermo Eduardo Ricny

Horacio Rapaport

Carlos Alberto Rincón Barber

Osvaldo Raúl Ravasi Deganutti

Luis Anselmo Ricciardino

Ricardo Arturo Rave

Miguel Angel Río Casas

María Teresa Ravignani

Jaime Nury Riquelme Gangas

Augusto Rebagliati

Daniel Jorge Risso

Alfredo Mauricio Reboredo

Guillermo Daniel Ritter Rosenfeld

Humberto Antonio Rébori

José Filemón Rivadeneira

Jorge Lucio Rébori
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Miguel Angel Rivadeneira

Tristán Omar Roldán

Roberto Abel Rivelli

Norberto Miguel Rollán Llull

Carlos. A Rizzo Molina

Carmen Candela Román de Iglesias

Oscar Alberto Rizzo

Nicolas Miguel Angel Roman

Emilio Roa Espinoza

Benito Vicente Romano

Gaston Jose Robles Toledo

Humberto Nicolas Romano

Julio Secundino Robles

Daniel Oscar Romanutti

Rubén Francisco Roca

Alfredo Romay Méndez

Antonio Eulogio Rocha

Graciela Alicia Romero de Metz

Néstor Rodas

Jorge Luis Romero

Abraham Eulogio Rodríguez

Laura Gladis Romero

Alicia Rodriguez Saenz de Bourg

Mario Osvaldo Romero

Ambrosio Abraham Rodriguez

Orlando Diego Romero

Carlos Esteban Rodríguez

Pedro Antonio Romero

Eduardo José Rodríguez

Roberto Julio Romero

Gustavo Adrián Rodríguez

Toribia Romero de Morales

Hector Hugo Rodriguez

Ana María Rómoli

José Luis Rodríguez Diéguez

Rodolfo Alberto Ron

Juan Antonio Rodríguez

Jorge Osvaldo Rondoletto Cenador

Luis Cristobal Rodriguez Burgos

Pedro Rondoletto

Marcelo Mario Rodríguez

Silvia Margarita Rondoletto Cenador

Mario Germán Rodríguez

Carlos Rafael Rosales

Miguel Agustin Rodriguez Scagliotti

Francisco Prospero Rosales

Nora Rodríguez Jurado de Olivera

Walter Claudio Rosenfeld

Ruben Desiderio Rodriguez

Raul Alberto Rossini

Carlos Maria Roggerone

Néstor Adolfo Rovegno

Jorge Mario Roitman

Ana Rubel de Castro

Blas Mario Rojas

Horacio Alberto Rubino
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Raquel Rubino

Rubén Gerardo Salinas

Pablo Gustavo Rueda

Jorge Alberto Salite

Jorge Luis Ruffa

Cecilia Noemí Salomone

Eduardo Edelmiro Ruival

Heraldo Miliciades Salvatierra

Fidelino Werter Ruiz

Carlos Ángel Salles Flores

Raul Ricardo Ruiz

José Ricardo San Martín

Ubaldo Fidel Ruiz

Jorge San Vicente Prieto

Daniel Lázaro Rus

Alberto Esteban Sánchez

Cristobal Constantino Russo

Elena Sánchez de Rapetti

Graciela Rutilo Artes

Elizabeth Graciela Sánchez

Julio César Saavedra

Enrique Angel Sanchez

Guido Arturo Saavedra Inostroza

Fernando Sanchez

Maria del Carmen Sabino

Gladys Ascención Sanchez Caceres

Nidia Beatriz Saens

María Teresa Sánchez

Hugo Alberto Sáez

Mario Valerio Sánchez

Ricardo Enrique Saibene

Miguel Benancio Sánchez

Alberto Said

Santiago Sánchez Viamonte

Eduardo Said

Eduardo Antonio Sanjurjo

Adrián Saidón

Néstor Julio Sanmartino

Edgardo Sajón

Norberto Daniel Sant' Angelo

Rene Rufino Salamanca

Manuel Alberto Santamaría

Ángela Alicia Salamone

Juan Carlos Santamarina

Diego Arturo Salas

Sandro Santana Alcaraz Castillo

Hector Ivan Salas

Carlos Santillan

Alfredo Daniel Salgado

Luis Agustin Santillan

Carlos Juan Salim Chalfoun

Mario Luis Santini

Jorge Luis Salinas

Héctor Vicente Santos

Ricardo Luis Salinas

Iris Margarita Santos
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Francisco René Santucho

Jorge Alejandro Segarra Acuña

Heldy Rubén Santucho

Laura Beatriz Segarra Acuña

Maria del Valle Santucho

Arlene Seguel

Mario Roberto Santucho

Andres Seguil

Mercedes Elmina Santucho

Daniel Armando Segura

Mónica Graciela Santucho

Victor Eduardo Seib

Simon Angel Sapag

Alberto Oscar Seindus

Héctor Saraceno

Alberto Semar

Jorge Antonio Saravia Acuña

Gregorio Marcelo Sember

Beatriz Sarti

Eduardo Aníbal Serrano

Antonio Mario Sasso

Raúl Alberto Serrano

Juan Miguel Satragno

Ingrid Sidaravicius de Avena

Guillermo Savloff

Miguel Angel Siddi

José Alberto Scaccheri

Enrique Sierra

José Rolando ScaddingRuben Oscar
Scardavilla

Mirta Silber de Perez
Kleber Mauricio Silva Iribarne Garay

Alicia Noemi Sciutto de Duclos

Luis Ismael Silva

Hugo Alberto Scutari Bellizzi

Néstor Eduardo Silva

Daniel Marcelo Schapira

Patricia Silvia Silberstein

José Francisco Schiller Mury

Georgina Simerman

Norma Alicia Schipani de Sasso

Carlos Francisco Simón

Miguel Ángel Schlatter

Roberto Juan Carmelo Sinigaglia

Juan Alberto Schudel

Alfredo Felipe Sinopoli

Miguel Schwartz

Norma Sintora Maglione de Solsona

Diego Hernando Secaud Merlo

Elena Siskopoulos Porras de Castillo

Carolina Sara Segal de Rovegno

Adolfo Skof

Oscar Eduardo Segal

Claudio Alberto Slemenson Wilber

Guillermo Oscar Segalli Barsottini

Salvador Sliba

Alicia Estela Segarra Acuña
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Samuel Leonardo Slutzky

Rubén Alberto Stockdale

Oscar Smith

Daniel Alberto Strada

Juan Marcelo Soler Guinard

Eduardo Suárez

María Cristina Solís de Marín

Fidelia Nora Suárez

Pedro Solís

Hugo Alberto Suárez

Ricardo Daniel Somaini

Ignacio Antonio Suarez

Ana María Sonder de Lewi

José Luis Suárez

Alejandro Renato Sonini

Juan Carlos Suárez

Roberto Ismael Sorba

Julio Everto Suárez

Federico Guillermo Soria Nacif

Omar Gedalio Suárez

Roque Angel Soriano

Petrona del C. Suarez de Cordero

Antonio Sosa

Roberto Daniel Suárez Barrera

Daniel Ernesto Sosa

Virginia Adela Suarez

Dora Nélida Sosa de Cruz

Carlos Adolfo Surraco Britos

Jose Antonio Sosa

Jorge Víctor Sznaider

Juan Carlos Sosa Gomez

Rodolfo Eduardo Taboada

Luis Alberto Sosa

Victor Manuel Taboada

María del Carmen Sosa de Piotti

Gaby Taborga Carvajal de Leyes

Delfor Santos Soto

Manuel Ascencio Tajan

Olga Silvia Souto Castillo

Juan Takara Higa

Marta Alicia Spagnoli de Vera

Antonio Tamayo

Carlos Osvaldo Spataro

Manuel Jesus Tamayo Martinez

Horacio Rodolfo Speratti

Guillermo Tamburini

Miguel Angel Serafin Spinella

Raúl Francisco Tapia Hernández

Carlos Alberto Squeri "Cali"

Irma Noemí Tardivo de Ghigliazza

Gustavo Eduardo Stati

Lucía Rosalinda Victoria Tartaglia

Ana Patricia Steimberg

Manuel Antonio Tartalo

Mario Alfredo Stirnemann

Adriana Elsa Tasada de Megna
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Adriana Leonor Tasca

Juana Torres

Federico Tatter

Luis Eduardo Torres

José Antonio Tejero

Pablo Torres

Ricardo Alberto Tellez

Hugo Ramon Torreta

Marcelo Rodolfo Tello

Fernando Alberto Torrez

Pablo Daniel Tello

Mario Luis Torterau

Rafael Armando Tello

Luis Tossi

Gisela Lidia Tenembaum

Pablo David Trejo Vallejos

Nestor Tere

Elisa Triana de Salas

Carlos Enrique Tereszecuk

Diana Miriam Triay de Llorens

Diana Esmeralda Teruggi de Mariani

Francisco Tripiana

Mónica Beatriz Teszkiewicz

Jorge Luis Trod

Jose Antonio Teves

Sergio Pedro Trod

Enrique Thilman Hooguen

Eduardo Héctor Trombini

Alfredo Mario Thomas Molina

María Teresa Trotta de Castelli

Miguel Ángel Tierno

Emilce Magdalena Trucco

María Felisa Tirinanzi

Sergio Fernando Tula

Francisco Enrique Tiseira

Oscar Arturo Udabe

Claudio Arturo Tisminetzky

Juan Ukmar

Lorenzo Homero Tobar Avilés

Eva Silvia Ullman de Casoy

Oscar Alfredo Toledo Torres

Nilsa Urquía

María Rosa Tolosa de Reggiardo

María Susana Ursi de Eggers

Osvaldo Leopoldo Tomás

Inés Magdalena Uhalde

Maria Esther Tommasi

Héctor Alfonso Uribe

María Graciela Toncovich

Felipe Arturo Urueña Alvarez

Irene Laura Torrents

Oscar Julian Urra Ferrarese

Hilda Argentina Torres Montenegro

Elena Graciela Vacas de Fortunato

Juan Carlos Torres

Olga Liliana Vaccarini de Rodríguez
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Marta Inés Vaccaro de Deria

María Rosa Vedoya de Suárez

Gustavo Alberto Vaisman

Hugo Arnaldo Vega

Roberto Adolfo Val

Joaquín Vega

Alfredo Valcarce Soto

José Blas Vega

Osvaldo Valdez

José Vicente Vega

Silvio Mario Valderrama

María Luisa Vega

Graciela Valdueza

Miguel Francisco Velásquez

Edgar Tulio Valenzuela

Catalina Martha Velazco de Morini

Felix Valero

Ricardo Horacio Veleda

Darío Miguel Valiño

Alberto Jorge Vendrell

María Mercedes Valiño

Víctor Vicente Veneziano

Graciela Vallejo

Rosalba Vensentini

Adriana Vera Vanella Boll

Francisco A. Ventimiglia

María del Carmen Vanella Boll

José Pablo Ventura

Pedro Varas

Franco Venturi

José Manuel Varela

Juan Carlos Vera

María Vargas Bustamante de Rueda

Roberto Miguel Vera Barros

David Horacio Varsavsky

Leticia Andrea Veraldi

Jorge Omar Vásquez

Graciela Cristina Verdecanna de
Carricondo

Daniel Omar Vattino

Luis Alberto Verdú

María Marta Vásquez

Edgardo Justino Vergara

Graciela Beatriz Vázquez

Hilda Zulma Vergara de Buffa

Harry José Vázquez

Mercedes Rosa Verón

José Antonio Vázquez Fernández

Juan Carlos Vicario

María Esther Vásquez de García

Miguel José Viceconte

Noemí Vazquez de Moresi

Eduardo Luis Vicente

Néstor Guillermo Vázquez Núñez

Héctor Alberto Vidal

Victorio Vazquez

Luis Hernan Videla Aguilera
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Abel Luis Vigo

Hanna Edla Wayrynen de Hietala

Jose Salvador Vila Bustos

Irene Diana Wechsler

Juan de Dios Vila

Mauricio Weinstein

Ercilia Vilar Pallas

Azize Weiss

Carmen Rosa Vilte de Loker

Marcelo Weisz

Marina Vilte

Tilo Wenner

Mario Juan Villa Colombo

Máximo Ricardo Wettengel

Patricia Villa de Suárez

Roberto Alejandro Wilson

Juan Carlos Villafañe Bena

Nora Irene Wolfson

Alicia Romelia Villalba

Silvia Haydee Wollert

Maria Ines Villalobos Ventura

Hugo José Yacopetti

Ana María Villanueva

Jorge Eugenio Yanes
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